Why Nehru signed and funded the Indus Waters Treaty that favoured Pakistan
The Indus Waters Treaty gave Pakistan control over most of the Indus system waters, while subjecting India, the upper riparian, to severe restrictions

In 1960, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru signed the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan — a deal that gave away control of 80% of the Indus system waters to India’s western neighbour. What’s more, India even paid £62 million to Pakistan for building infrastructure to use that water. Why did Nehru agree to such a lopsided deal? Here’s the explanation in five sharp points:
1. Cold War pressure
At the time, the United States and Britain were deeply invested in stabilising Pakistan as a Cold War ally against Soviet influence. The World Bank (IBRD), pushed by the US and UK, was anything but neutral — it aligned with Western strategic priorities. The pressure on India to sign the Indus Waters Treaty and avoid a prolonged water conflict was immense.
2. Fear of international isolation
Refusing a treaty risked India being painted as an aggressive, obstructive power, jeopardising its relations with Western powers and access to vital international loans, grants, and World Bank funding. Newly independent and economically fragile, India couldn’t afford diplomatic and economic isolation or the risk of another confrontation with Pakistan.
3. India’s idealistic vision of peace
Jawaharlal Nehru saw rivers as common natural resources meant for the collective good of humanity. India’s foreign policy establishment in the 1950s was also driven by a moralist, idealist, and anti-imperialist worldview. Hard-nosed realpolitik was then seen as an imperialist residue. This sounds naïve now — but within the Gandhian-Nehruvian moral framework, it was entirely consistent.
4. A miscalculated bet on Pakistan
Scarred by the horrors of Partition, Nehru genuinely hoped the treaty would foster long-term peace and goodwill with Pakistan, viewing it as a diplomatic investment in regional stability. He might have believed that once relations normalised, India could renegotiate the arrangement on better terms. He clearly overestimated Pakistan’s long-term intentions and underestimated the strategic consequences of this concession.
5. India’s inability to harness its own waters
It was very difficult for India to divert the waters of the Indus system into its northern states because the mighty Pir Panjal mountain range stood in the way. In 1947, India also lacked the dams and infrastructure needed to store and use this water wherever possible before it flowed into Pakistan. Added to this were economic weakness, diplomatic pressure, and post-Partition instability, which made it politically impossible for India to avoid a quick settlement with Pakistan.
In hindsight, the Indus Waters Treaty was less a treaty of equals and more a product of Cold War coercion, Nehruvian idealism, and India’s desperate post-Partition vulnerabilities. In reasserting itself today, India is not reneging on a legacy — it’s trying to correct an imbalance history imposed upon it.