Why Nehru signed and funded the Indus Waters Treaty that favoured Pakistan
The Indus Waters Treaty gave Pakistan control over most of the Indus system waters, while subjecting India, the upper riparian, to severe restrictions
In 1960, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru signed the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan. Under this agreement, India ceded the waters of three western rivers of the Indus system — the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab — to Pakistan. Together, these rivers accounted for nearly 75% of the total water volume of the entire Indus system. The remaining three eastern rivers — the Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi — were allocated for India’s use.
To help Pakistan build the infrastructure needed to utilise its share effectively, India also contributed £6.2 million to the Indus Basin Development Fund — an international financial arrangement supported by the U.S., U.K., Germany, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the World Bank.
Why did Jawaharlal Nehru agree to such a seemingly unequal treaty over rivers that originate in India? Based on expert views and historical records, here’s the explanation in five sharp points:
1. Cold War pressure
At the time, the United States and Britain were deeply invested in stabilising Pakistan as a Cold War ally against Soviet influence. The World Bank (IBRD), under pressure from the US and UK, was anything but neutral — it aligned itself with Western strategic priorities. The pressure on India to sign the Indus Waters Treaty and avoid a prolonged water conflict was immense.
India may also have been swayed by General Ayub Khan’s 1959 offer of “joint defence with India” amid deteriorating India–China relations. This was not out of concern for India’s security, but a reflection of Ayub’s alignment with the West — Pakistan was a member of both SEATO and CENTO, which viewed the Communist bloc, particularly the USSR and China, as the greatest threat to their existence.
2. Fear of international isolation
Refusing a treaty risked India being painted as an aggressive, obstructive power, jeopardising its relations with Western powers and access to vital international loans, grants, and World Bank funding. Newly independent and economically fragile, India couldn’t afford diplomatic and economic isolation or the risk of another confrontation with Pakistan.
3. India’s idealistic vision of peace
Jawaharlal Nehru saw rivers as common natural resources meant for the collective good of humanity. India’s foreign policy establishment in the 1950s was also driven by a moralist, idealist, and anti-imperialist worldview. Hard-nosed realpolitik was then seen as an imperialist residue. This sounds naïve now — but within the Gandhian-Nehruvian moral framework, it was entirely consistent.
4. A miscalculated bet on Pakistan
Scarred by the horrors of Partition, Nehru genuinely hoped the treaty would foster long-term peace and goodwill with Pakistan, viewing it as a diplomatic investment in regional stability. In fact, on 30 November 1960, he told the Lok Sabha, “We purchased a settlement, if you like; we purchased peace to that extent — and it is good for both countries.” Some experts believe he may also have thought that once relations normalised, India could renegotiate the arrangement on better terms. In hindsight, he clearly overestimated Pakistan’s long-term intentions and underestimated the strategic consequences of this concession.
5. India’s inability to harness its own waters
It was very difficult for India to divert the waters of the Indus system into its northern states because the mighty Pir Panjal mountain range stood in the way. In 1947, India also lacked the dams and infrastructure needed to store and use this water wherever possible before it flowed into Pakistan. Added to this were economic weakness, diplomatic pressure, and post-Partition instability, which made it politically impossible for India to avoid a quick settlement with Pakistan.
Renowned water resources expert and leader of the Indian delegation for the Indus Waters Treaty negotiations, Niranjan Das Gulhati, recalls in one of his books: “When I called on the Prime Minister (Jawaharlal Nehru) on 28th February 1961, my last day in office, in a sad tone he said, ‘Gulhati, I had hoped that this agreement would open the way to settlement on other problems, but we are where we were.’”
And that says it all.
In hindsight, the Indus Waters Treaty was less a treaty of equals and more a product of Cold War coercion, Nehruvian idealism, and India’s desperate post-Partition vulnerabilities. In reasserting itself today, India is not reneging on a legacy — it is trying to correct an imbalance history imposed upon it.