Will the Iran war weaken Tehran or strengthen US’ rivals?
As the Strait of Hormuz closes and oil surges, will weakening Tehran inadvertently fuel a Russian resurgence and Chinese expansion?
By Sanjay Dubey
Wars are rarely judged only by what they do to the country being targeted. They are also judged by what they do to the wider balance of power. The recent U.S.—Israel confrontation with Iran may well weaken Tehran in the short term, but the deeper strategic question is whether it simultaneously opens opportunities for America’s larger geopolitical rivals, particularly Russia and China.
The stated objective of the campaign against Iran has been clear. Washington and Israel argue that reducing Iran’s military capacity will limit its ability to threaten regional partners such as Israel and project influence across the Middle East through allied militias and political networks. Iran’s military infrastructure and economic resources are under pressure, and that in itself could curb Tehran’s regional ambitions for some time. From this perspective, the war is presented as a strategic necessity — a move intended to prevent a more dangerous future confrontation with a nuclear armed Iran.
But wars produce consequences that cannot be contained by military superiority. As of early March 2026, the conflict has plunged the region into near-total energy paralysis. The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed to commercial traffic despite the U.S. military’s efforts to reopen the waterway. With more than 150 tankers currently idle in the Gulf of Oman and major refineries in Saudi Arabia and Qatar declaring force majeure, the global economy is no longer merely anticipating an energy shock — it is living through one.
There is also a striking irony emerging from this blockade. For much of the past two years, the West sought to isolate Russia economically, pressuring countries like India to reduce purchases of Russian crude. But the closure of the Strait has fundamentally flipped the script. With roughly a fifth of the world’s oil and LNG supply trapped in the war zone, Russian oil — once the pariah of global markets — has suddenly become an essential stabilizing supply.
For Moscow, the conflict is an unexpected lifeline. As Brent crude surges past $100 per barrel, Russia finds its economic leverage restored and its previously “discounted” oil has now become highly sought-after. It is one of the paradoxes of global geopolitics: a campaign intended to weaken Tehran has inadvertently eased the economic pressure on Moscow.
China’s strategic calculus is different but equally important. Beijing has deep economic ties with the Middle East and depends heavily on energy imports from the region. Instability there is not ideal for China in the short term. Yet the geopolitical picture is more complicated. The central strategic competition for the United States in the coming decades is widely expected to revolve around China, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. A prolonged conflict involving Iran risks drawing American military resources, diplomatic attention and political capital back into the Middle East — a region Washington had been trying, for years, to step away from. Every major crisis that pulls the United States back into the Gulf potentially gives China more strategic breathing space in Asia.
There is also a diplomatic dimension to this shift. Both Moscow and Beijing have tried to cultivate the image of defenders of stability while portraying others as sources of global instability. When the United States becomes directly involved in military action, it leaves room for China and other powers to position themselves as advocates of restraint and negotiation. In an international system where narratives increasingly matter as much as military strength, this positioning can sway how Global South countries perceive and respond to the conflict.
None of this means the war automatically weakens the United States. Iran’s power may indeed be curtailed, and that could reshape the security balance in the Middle East in ways that benefit Washington and its regional partners. But strategic outcomes are rarely linear in an interconnected world where energy markets, alliances, and geopolitical rivalries overlap and collide.
The real measure of the conflict will therefore not lie only in the damage inflicted on Iran, but in the broader strategic environment that emerges afterward. If the war remains limited and short, the United States and Israel may succeed in curbing not only Tehran’s ambitions but benefiting from it. If it becomes prolonged or destabilizes energy markets for an extended period, however, the conflict could produce a paradoxical outcome: a weakened Iran, angry and exhausted U.S. allies in the Middle East, but a stronger Russia and a more strategically comfortable China.
There is an additional dimension to consider. The unilateral character of the U.S.—Israel campaign can also hand Russia and China potent rhetorical tools: Moscow can equate its “preemptive” actions in Ukraine to Washington’s strikes on perceived Iranian threats, while Beijing gains narrative leverage to frame potential moves on Taiwan as defending sovereignty against similar “aggression.” Moreover, the U.S. entanglement in the Middle East diverts its attention and resources completely from the Ukraine war, while surging oil revenues—fueled by Hormuz disruptions— can bolster Russia to intensify its aggression there.
In the end, the most important question is not simply whether Iran loses. It is whether the United States has won its military “victory” at the cost of its strategic goals elsewhere.