For decades, the friction between India and Pakistan was largely contained within South Asia. Occasionally, it spilled into international forums, and at times its echoes reached the Middle East—though usually confined to cricket fields. That is now changing. In recent months, the Middle East has emerged as a primary arena for this rivalry. At the center of this shift is an informal alignment of four Islamic nations, with Pakistan playing a leading role.

This development stands in contrast to the formal Quad that India had invested significant strategic capital in. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—consisting of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—was born from shared relief efforts after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and eventually formalised to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific. For New Delhi, it was a golden ticket to a high table where it could balance the rising influence of China. However, Donald Trump’s return to the White House and his administration’s isolationist “America First” stance, along with cooler India–US relations, have left it a largely dormant forum.

Even as the original Quad faded into the background, a new and more assertive formation began to take shape in West Asia. This informal Quad—bringing together Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia (PETSA)—has evolved from a collection of shared interests into a more coordinated alignment, sometimes described as a “West Asian Quad,” or “Islamic NATO.” Unlike the formal Quad, which has often moved cautiously, PETSA seems to be moving faster on key security and strategic issues. For New Delhi, the irony is hard to miss: this emerging alignment, which places Pakistan at its centre, appears to draw tacit support from the United States, the leader of the original Quad, and China, the very power the Quad was designed to counter.

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To understand this shift better, it helps to recall the optimism of the early 2020s. At the time, India was central to a new diplomatic architecture. The Quad was at its peak, holding high-profile summits and moving with a sense of purpose aimed at balancing China’s growing influence. It was in this atmosphere that the I2U2 (India, Israel, the UAE, and the US) also took shape. Often described as a “West Asian Quad,” it complemented the original Quad’s broader strategic outlook. Together, these frameworks reflected India’s attempt to project influence across both the Indo-Pacific and West Asia. But as the political climate in Washington shifted, the momentum behind this approach began to decline.

The emergence of the PETSA grouping can be traced to a series of events that reshaped regional calculations, most notably Operation Sindoor in May 2025. Launched by India in response to a terrorist attack in Pahalgam, the operation marked a shift from strategic restraint to a more assertive doctrine of deterrence. Pakistan, however, used the moment to reposition itself globally, strengthening its ties with the United States while also engaging more closely with major powers in the Muslim world—Turkey with its advanced military industry, Saudi Arabia with its vast capital, and Egypt with its control over the Suez Canal. In doing so, it sought to present the case that their interests were better served by working together during a period of regional instability.

A recent development added to Pakistan’s westward shift. The World Bank has moved Pakistan from its South Asia grouping to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region for the 2026 fiscal year. While this may seem like a bureaucratic adjustment, it changes how Pakistan’s economy is viewed globally. Instead of being compared with India or Bangladesh, it is now benchmarked against Gulf and North African economies. This suggests that Pakistan is beginning to operate in a different economic space—one increasingly shaped by Gulf investment and West Asian partnerships.

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The PETSA alignment is not a simple monolith; it brings together actors that, until recently, had strained relations. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt are only gradually moving past years of diplomatic tension. In this context, Pakistan has emerged as a key connecting link, maintaining robust ties with every other actor in the group. More importantly, as tensions around Iran continue to shape the region, Pakistan remains the only member of the grouping with a functional backchannel to Tehran. This unique position makes Islamabad indispensable for the group’s current primary mission: de-escalating the potentially catastrophic Iran-Israel conflict.

Pakistan’s leadership within PETSA is further cemented by its nuclear capability and its deep defense partnership with Riyadh. The Saudi-Pakistan Mutual Defense Agreement (SDMA), signed in late 2025, is a historic “collective security” pact. It contains a NATO-like provision that treats an act of aggression against one as an act against both, effectively making Pakistan the primary security guarantor for the heart of the Middle East—a role once held exclusively by the United States. This alliance provides Saudi Arabia with the “boots on the ground” and a nuclear umbrella it has long desired, while providing Pakistan with the financial lifeblood it needs to sustain its economy.

No country can remain a passive observer to such shifts. With the formal Quad losing momentum, New Delhi has also been trying to expand its western partnerships. The most significant is the Strategic Defence Partnership framework with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Initiated with a formal signing in early 2026, this partnership has deepened a relationship once centred on oil and labour into one with growing security and strategic dimensions. This has coincided with the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC in early 2026—a move that signals Abu Dhabi’s willingness to pursue a more independent geopolitical path, rather than align fully with Saudi Arabia. For India, a more autonomous UAE provides an opening to secure long-term energy ties and strengthen its maritime connectivity in the region.

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At the heart of India’s competing vision is the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), an infrastructure project linking Indian ports to Europe through the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel. It is intended to strengthen trade, connectivity, and supply chains, while offering an alternative to parts of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This may encourage regional players to balance their security alignments with Pakistan against their economic partnerships with India.

The inclusion of India in the ‘3+1’ summit with Israel, Greece, and Cyprus is also seen as useful in giving India access as far as the Mediterranean. This adds a secondary strategic axis, particularly with countries that have existing tensions with Turkey. Together, these partnerships reflect a wider network of economic and strategic ties—from the Arabian Sea to the eastern Mediterranean—linked to India’s long-term interests.

For decades, India projected itself as a restrained power and a champion of non-alignment. That position is now being recalibrated, most visibly through its deeper engagement with West Asia, including its strategic relationship with Israel and participation in emerging regional frameworks. Some critics argue this risks diluting India’s standing as a voice of the Global South. But New Delhi appears to be betting on ‘calibrated multi-alignment’ and ‘strategic autonomy’—seeking to balance hard strategic interests with its longstanding global image.

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“Based on conversations with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Asim Munir of Pakistan, and wherein they requested that I hold off the destructive force being sent tonight to Iran… I agree to suspend the bombing and attack of Iran for a period of two weeks. This will be a double-sided CEASEFIRE!”

Donald Trump, the President of the United States, wrote on social media announcing the ceasefire between the US-Israel alliance and Iran.

In an official statement, Iran’s Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi, responding to the “brotherly request of PM Sharif”, also declared the ceasefire on behalf of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. He expressed gratitude and appreciation for his “dear brothers HE Prime Minister of Pakistan Sharif and HE Field Marshal Munir for their tireless efforts to end the war in the region.”

In the volatile weeks following the February 28 US–Israeli strike that killed Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, a quiet but profound role reversal unfolded in South Asian diplomacy. Pakistan—often dismissed as a rogue actor in world affairs—emerged as the most visible mediator in the Middle East crisis. India, with its centuries-old civilisational links to Iran, strong ties with both the US and Israel, non-aligned legacy, membership of the Quad, presidency of BRICS+, and reputation as a principled global voice, found itself largely on the margins—issuing measured calls for restraint while watching Islamabad take the lead in a conflict that affected not just a few countries, but much of the world.

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This is remarkable. Until May 2025, when Pakistan fought a four-day war (Operation Sindoor) with India, the country was widely seen as a pariah state. At the time, both Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and General Asim Munir were struggling to hold their positions and keep the country together amid deep economic and political crises. But Pakistan’s global standing and Shehbaz Sharif and Asim Munir’s domestic positions improved dramatically after that.

“In mediating between these two parties, Pakistan pulled off one of its most resounding diplomatic victories in years. It is a stunning reversal of fortunes for a country that Mr. Trump once derided as offering ‘nothing but lies and deceit’ and that the Biden administration shunned,” wrote the New York Times, the world’s most influential media outlet, describing Pakistan’s role in the US-Israel-Iran ceasefire.

From India’s point of view, this is more than a one-off event. Some analysts see it as a sign of erosion in the country’s earlier international standing—a shift driven by the steady dilution of a brand that could assert self-interest without appearing selfish. That brand once allowed India to punch above its material weight.

On March 1 — the very next day after the US-Israel strike on Iran — Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif issued a public statement on X. It offered “the most sincere condolences on the martyrdom” of Khamenei, expressed solidarity with the Iranian people, and explicitly criticised the strike as a “violation of the norms of international law” and the “age-old convention that Heads of State/Government should not be targeted.” It was a careful balance that sounded empathetic and principled, without naming the US or Israel. President Asif Ali Zardari and opposition voices reinforced the message. Within days, Pakistan turned this into concrete action.

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By late March, Pakistan was relaying messages between US and Iran. Islamabad convened backchannel summits with Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt, floated practical ceasefire proposals, and positioned itself as the most desired mediator. When the fragile two-week ceasefire took hold on April 7–8, Pakistan was at the centre of attention.

Michael Kugelman of the Atlantic Council calls it “a large feather in the cap” for Pakistan. But he also points to another dimension: “Pakistan has been willing to engage in unconventional diplomatic tactics that score points in Washington — including excessive flattery and commercial opportunities with Trump’s inner circle.” Somewhat similar tactics involving China and Xi Jinping may also have worked in Pakistan’s favour. Trump may also have leaned toward Islamabad for mediation in part because it offered a level of flexibility that is hard to expect from most other countries.

During this period, India’s posture could hardly have been more restrained. The Ministry of External Affairs issued generic statements following the US–Israel strike, urging “restraint, dialogue, and de-escalation,” while placing strong emphasis on protecting the nearly 10 million-strong Indian diaspora in the Gulf and safeguarding energy routes. No high-level condolence message was issued by Prime Minister Narendra Modi or External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar in the crucial initial days. It was only on March 5—five to six days later—that Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri signed the condolence book at the Iranian Embassy, using carefully neutral language referring to the “demise,” rather than the “martyrdom,” of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei.

Opposition leaders—from Congress to regional parties—called the delay an “abdication, not neutrality.” Typically measured voices like Shashi Tharoor noted that, irrespective of condemnation, a timely expression of grief was the bare diplomatic minimum given India’s longstanding ties with Iran.

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The messaging gap widened when India strongly condemned Iranian retaliation against Gulf states and Israel and co-sponsored a UNSC resolution targeting Tehran, while remaining silent on the initial assassination’s breach of sovereignty norms and on the deaths of 168 schoolgirls in the US-Israeli strike. Domestic vulnerabilities — energy shocks from the Hormuz closure, remittances from the Gulf, and defence cooperation with the US and Israel — clearly drove the calculus. Yet the optics were unambiguous: a tilt toward transactional partners at the expense of visible solidarity with an old friend and old principles.

What India got wrong

Three interlocking miscalculations might have defined New Delhi’s approach during the Iran war.

First, an apparent over-optimism about Iranian regime fragility. After Khamenei’s death, initial assessments in Delhi (mirroring some Western thinking) seem to have expected the regime to collapse or at least become severely weakened. When the regime instead showed structural resilience, India was forced to change course — requesting safe passage for its ships through the Strait of Hormuz and resuming Iranian oil and LPG imports after a long hiatus. Returning to the “same regime” after early silence only reinforced perceptions of opportunism.

Second, by prioritising only immediate self-interest over broader signalling, India ceded the moral-diplomatic high ground that Pakistan skilfully occupied. Sharif’s Day One statement on norms instantly got Pakistan into Tehran’s good books without burning bridges in Washington. India’s silence on the assassination of Khamenei, by contrast, fed narratives that New Delhi had subordinated principles and old relations to its ties with the US and Israel. Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel exactly before the US-Israel attack also muddied the waters.

Third, the absence of proactive quiet outreach. While Pakistan flooded backchannels with proposals and venue offers, India explicitly ruled out any “go-between” role. No early public or private ideas to improve the situation were floated. The vacuum was filled by Islamabad.

A pattern, not an outlier

This did not emerge in a vacuum. It fits a recurring script of recent years — from Operation Sindoor to India’s deteriorating relations with Bangladesh.

In May 2025’s Operation Sindoor — India’s precision strikes on terror sites in Pakistan/PoJK after the Pahalgam attack — New Delhi emphasised unilateral success and bilateral resolution. Trump claimed he “stopped the war” via trade leverage and mediation. India’s categorical denial of any third-party role irritated Washington. Pakistan, more flexibly, gave the mediation credit and earned Trump’s goodwill. India could have handled this issue more deftly but did not.

During Operation Sindoor we also failed to present our side of the story effectively to the world, the way Pakistan did. While two women military officers — not fully equipped for the job — were left to put forward India’s case in a one-sided manner, and no prominent leader from the ruling administration was visible, Pakistan’s army, its political leaders and its lobbyists in America were doing everything possible on every important forum to present their viewpoint. India tried to rectify this mistake when it sent the all-party parliamentary delegations to different parts of the world. But the damage was already done.

The 2024 Bangladesh crisis is another case in point. While granting refuge to ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was an unavoidable necessity, India’s subsequent handling — marked by visa refusals, exclusion of Bangladeshi players from the IPL to pander to domestic politics, and the expulsion of the Bangladesh team from the T20 World Cup — escalated a difficult problem into a diplomatic disaster. These actions deeply bruised public sentiment in Bangladesh, isolating India in its own backyard. The optics are particularly jarring as Pakistan and China gain ground in a country that owes its very existence to India.

Even the Trump relationship carried self-inflicted costs. Narendra Modi’s enthusiastic “Abki baar Trump Sarkar” rallies in 2019–20 built personal rapport with Donald Trump, but might not have sat well with Joe Biden. During the 2024 US presidential campaign, Modi maintained a cautious distance from Trump and reportedly did not meet him despite his overtures. When Trump won re-election, the earlier hedging became problematic. This is what happens when a country aligns itself too closely with one political party in another country instead of cultivating bipartisan support.

All this seems to suggest that India is losing the strength that came from its principles, while at the same time not succeeding at the new transactional approach it is now pursuing.

India cannot indulge in what Kugelman describes as the “unconventional diplomatic tactics” of Pakistan. Its historic influence came not only from its size but from its non-aligned tradition — speaking up for sovereignty, standing with anti-colonial causes, and acting as a balancer. That brand made its voice matter far beyond its GDP or military power. But staying silent on big global issues now risks turning India into just another pragmatic deal-maker whose principles look changeable.

The April 10 talks in Islamabad are not yet final. A full US-Iran deal is still not certain. India still has strong cards: good working relations with all three — the US, Israel and Iran; its place in both QUAD and BRICS (India currently has its presidency); and an economy bigger than almost any other country except the superpowers. If India can use these advantages intelligently, it can still have its skin in the game.

India is too big and too important to be sidelined. But what counts the most for a country like India is the courage to speak at the right time without being seen as picking clear sides.

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On March 4, 2026, during a discussion at the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney ended his remarks with an unusual gesture. Instead of waving or nodding, he briefly pressed his palms together to thank the audience.

It was a small, almost reflexive moment at the end of a high-stakes program that many might not have even noticed. But for those who did, it might have triggered a vivid memory of exactly six years ago.

It was March 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic first tightened its grip on India, forcing a nationwide lockdown. At that time, the world was scrambling for ways to say “hello” or “thank you” without risking infection. Six years later, seeing one of the most educated leaders of the G7 fold his hands in a high-level forum in Australia suggests a deeper reality: India’s most widely used body gesture has moved beyond a cultural symbol to become a global symbol of hygienic, sincere, and refined etiquette.

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The Indian folded-hand gesture, called the Anjali Mudra, is rooted in the Vedas and the Natya Shastra. It has always served a multi-dimensional purpose: it is the posture of worship, the standard social greeting (Namaste), and a profound expression of gratitude. And these are not separate from each other. Whether you say “hello” or a heartfelt “thank you,” you also acknowledge a spiritual presence in the other person.

In the West, folded hands (palms together) were never a gesture of greeting. They emerged by the early medieval period and became widespread in the Middle Ages as a symbol of submission and loyalty. A weak vassal’s folded hands stretched toward a lord was a show of submission. This was later transposed into Christian prayer to signify submission to God.

In Jewish tradition too, folded hands appear in early descriptions of prayer. The Babylonian sage Rabba bar Nachmani is described in the Talmud as praying with folded hands, suggesting that the gesture was also known in parts of the ancient Middle East as an expression of reverence.

For centuries, these two versions lived parallel lives: the Indian one as a multi-purpose cultural symbol, and the Western one used strictly for addressing the divine.

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This was not the case in several other parts of the world, especially across Asia. Long before COVID-19, the Anjali Mudra had already become part of daily life in many societies. Between the 1st and 13th centuries, as Hinduism and Buddhism spread across Asia, the folded-hands greeting evolved into local forms: the wai in Thailand, the sampeah in Cambodia, the nop in Laos and gassho in Japan.

But until recently, Westerners mostly encountered this gesture as tourists or through the global rise of yoga and meditation. In the West, it was something “exotic” that you did at the end of a class or while experimenting with Indian spirituality. But they rarely folded their hands while meeting a bank manager, greeting a prime minister, or expressing gratitude.

The year 2020 changed the way humans interact. As the pandemic struck, the most fundamental Western social ritual—the handshake—was revealed to be a primary vector for disease.

Historically, Western discourse had often labeled Indian social habits as “unhygienic.” But as the world entered the COVID era, the script was flipped. Namaste was suddenly the world’s most hygienic greeting. It then saw rapid adoption by world leaders who had long been committed to the “firm handshake.” Donald Trump, Emmanuel Macron, and Charles III were all seen using the gesture during the height of the crisis.

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But when Mark Carney used the gesture at the Lowy Institute, he wasn’t being cautious about germs. He appeared to be using it as a natural cultural expression of gratitude. What makes this especially striking is that he did so at a time when India’s global voice appears deeply subdued.

It may signify something more as well. In a world where Carney argues that middle powers must increasingly set the agenda, adopting the greeting of the world’s most populous democracy becomes a powerful symbol—signalling a shift toward a multipolar world that treats others with humility and respect.

So far, the West has adopted only the “base version” of India’s folded-hands gesture for safety and gratitude. It has yet to learn its grammar. Many may not realise that when palms are joined at chest level, it signals equality, while a slight forward bend makes the greeting more respectful.

They may also learn that folded hands touching one’s forehead can signal extreme respect. With subtle variations, the same gesture can even express sarcastic submission—or, in certain postures, quiet arrogance.

Perhaps that last variation might even make the gesture attractive to the Donald Trumps of the world—who may not find its humble versions as appealing in normal times as they did during the pandemic.

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Wars are rarely judged only by what they do to the country being targeted. They are also judged by what they do to the wider balance of power. The recent U.S.—Israel confrontation with Iran may well weaken Tehran in the short term, but the deeper strategic question is whether it simultaneously opens opportunities for America’s larger geopolitical rivals, particularly Russia and China.

The stated objective of the campaign against Iran has been clear. Washington and Israel argue that reducing Iran’s military capacity will limit its ability to threaten regional partners such as Israel and project influence across the Middle East through allied militias and political networks. Iran’s military infrastructure and economic resources are under pressure, and that in itself could curb Tehran’s regional ambitions for some time. From this perspective, the war is presented as a strategic necessity — a move intended to prevent a more dangerous future confrontation with a nuclear armed Iran.

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But wars produce consequences that cannot be contained by military superiority. As of early March 2026, the conflict has plunged the region into near-total energy paralysis. The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed to commercial traffic despite the U.S. military’s efforts to reopen the waterway. With more than 150 tankers currently idle in the Gulf of Oman and major refineries in Saudi Arabia and Qatar declaring force majeure, the global economy is no longer merely anticipating an energy shock — it is living through one.

There is also a striking irony emerging from this blockade. For much of the past two years, the West sought to isolate Russia economically, pressuring countries like India to reduce purchases of Russian crude. But the closure of the Strait has fundamentally flipped the script. With roughly a fifth of the world’s oil and LNG supply trapped in the war zone, Russian oil — once the pariah of global markets — has suddenly become an essential stabilizing supply.

For Moscow, the conflict is an unexpected lifeline. As Brent crude surges past $100 per barrel, Russia finds its economic leverage restored and its previously “discounted” oil has now become highly sought-after. It is one of the paradoxes of global geopolitics: a campaign intended to weaken Tehran has inadvertently eased the economic pressure on Moscow.

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China’s strategic calculus is different but equally important. Beijing has deep economic ties with the Middle East and depends heavily on energy imports from the region. Instability there is not ideal for China in the short term. Yet the geopolitical picture is more complicated. The central strategic competition for the United States in the coming decades is widely expected to revolve around China, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. A prolonged conflict involving Iran risks drawing American military resources, diplomatic attention and political capital back into the Middle East — a region Washington had been trying, for years, to step away from. Every major crisis that pulls the United States back into the Gulf potentially gives China more strategic breathing space in Asia.

There is also a diplomatic dimension to this shift. When the United States becomes directly involved in unilateral military action, it allows China and Russia to portray Washington as a source of global instability, even as they position themselves as advocates of restraint and negotiation. In an international system where narratives increasingly matter as much as military strength, this framing can shape how countries in the Global South perceive and respond to the conflict.

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None of this means the war will automatically weaken the United States. If it remains limited and short, Washington and Israel may succeed not only in curbing Tehran’s ambitions but also in deriving strategic advantage. If it becomes prolonged or destabilizes energy markets for an extended period, however, the conflict could produce a paradoxical outcome: a weakened Iran, frustrated and fatigued U.S. allies in the Middle East, a stronger Russia, and a more strategically comfortable China.

There is an additional dimension to consider. The unilateral character of the U.S.—Israel campaign can also hand Russia and China potent rhetorical tools: Moscow can equate its “preemptive” actions in Ukraine to Washington’s strikes on perceived Iranian threats, while Beijing gains narrative leverage to frame potential moves on Taiwan as defending sovereignty against similar “aggression.” Moreover, the U.S. entanglement in the Middle East diverts its attention and resources completely from the Ukraine war, while surging oil revenues—fueled by Hormuz disruptions— can bolster Russia to intensify its aggression there.

In the end, the most important question is not simply whether Iran loses. It is whether the United States has won its military “victory” at the cost of its strategic goals elsewhere.

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News that a United States submarine had torpedoed and sunk the Iranian warship IRIS Dena about 40 nautical miles off Sri Lanka this week took many observers by surprise. An attack like this so far from the Persian Gulf – and in a key trade route connecting China to the Middle East – suggests the arena of this war may be widening.

But the incident also highlights something rarely well understood outside military and legal circles: the law of naval warfare. Many have wondered: was this attack lawful? And who was under an obligation to rescue survivors?

When does the law of naval warfare apply?

The law of naval warfare is a subset of the law of armed conflict. It sets out permissions and protections for combatants, civilians and neutral actors engaged in conflict at sea.

Importantly, it applies regardless of whether the resort to force was lawful. In other words, you’re supposed to follow the law of the sea even if your whole justification for war in the first place isn’t legal under international law.

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What’s more, the conduct of operations at sea is regulated by the law of naval warfare whether or not war has been formally declared.

The law of naval warfare also takes precedence over the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (where the two come into tension). This reflects the principle of lex specialis in international law, meaning the more specific body of law applies.

These rules have developed over centuries as states sought to regulate the conduct of conflict at sea while still allowing navies to operate effectively.

So, was it legal for the US to sink the Iranian warship?

Yes, it was a lawful target.

Under the law of naval warfare, warships belonging to a state engaged in an international armed conflict are military objectives by nature. The rules say they may be lawfully targeted.

Such attacks may occur within the 12 nautical mile territorial waters of the states that are party to the international armed conflict (the belligerents) or anywhere on the high seas. This means, effectively, that such an attack could happen anywhere outside the 12 nautical mile territorial waters of neutral states.

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If the Iranian warship was within Sri Lankan waters (that is, within 12 nautical miles of the Sri Lankan coast) at the time, the attack wouldn’t have been lawful. But in this case, IRIS Dena was reportedly operating outside Sri Lanka’s territorial waters and therefore constitutes a lawful military target.

What does the law say about rescue of survivors?

The law of naval warfare also sets out obligations regarding the rescue of survivors. Under the Second Geneva Convention of 1949, parties to a conflict must – after each engagement – take all possible measures to search for and collect the shipwrecked, wounded and sick.

These rules require belligerents, so far as military circumstances permit, to assist survivors at sea. In practice, however, submarines face particular challenges in fulfilling this obligation. Surfacing to rescue survivors may expose them to significant risk. You also can’t usually fit a large number of survivors on a submarine.

If a submarine cannot safely surface to rescue survivors, it may instead facilitate rescue by reporting their location to other vessels or authorities. This practice has been noted in some key legal commentary on submarine warfare.

The swift response of the Sri Lankan navy, which rescued 32 sailors from IRIS Dena, suggests authorities were informed quickly of the incident. (Sri Lankan officials say 87 bodies were also retrieved).

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Given the damage suffered by IRIS Dena and the reported casualties, the ship’s crew was unlikely to have been able to transmit their location themselves. This may also explain why early reports suggested a submarine had sunk the vessel, before the US confirmed its involvement.

It is also unlikely the crew of IRIS Dena would have immediately known they had been struck by a submarine-launched torpedo. Such a torpedo would typically be fired from very far away, beyond the detection range of a ship’s hull-mounted sonar.

A lawful military target

While debate continues over the legal justification for the United States entering the conflict with Iran, the conduct of hostilities at sea is nonetheless governed by the law of naval warfare.

Under that framework, IRIS Dena therefore constitutes a lawful military target, and efforts to facilitate the rescue of survivors are consistent with those obligations.

Jennifer Parker is an Adjunct Professor at Defence and Security Institute at The University of Western Australia. She is also, an Adjunct Fellow at Naval Studies, The University of New South Wales, Sydney.

This article was first published on The Conversation.

In a landmark decision that has sent shockwaves from the White House to New Delhi, the United States Supreme Court ruled on February 20, 2026, that President Donald Trump lacked the legal authority to unilaterally impose sweeping global tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). For India, which had been pushed to the brink of a trade war with effective tariffs as high as 50%, the ruling is more than a legal victory—it is a validation of New Delhi’s strategic patience.

As other nations like Japan, Vietnam, South Korea, the UK, and the EU rushed to secure trade deals with the U.S. under the shadow of “Liberation Day” threats, India stood its ground. Now, with the legal floor of Trump’s trade policy falling through, the “almost ready” India-US trade deal is in a state of flux. The question for New Delhi is no longer how to mitigate a 50% tariff, but why it should settle for 18% when the legal basis for those threats has been declared invalid.

The 50 percent pressure cooker

The trade friction began on what President Trump dubbed “Liberation Day”—April 2, 2025—when he announced a 26% “reciprocal tariff” on Indian imports, later adjusted to 25%, citing a national emergency over trade deficits. By August 2025, the pressure intensified. Citing India’s continued imports of Russian oil, the administration slapped an additional 25% “punitive duty” on Indian goods, bringing the effective tariff to a staggering 50%.

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This “double-whammy” forced India into a corner. For months, Indian negotiators faced a binary choice: accept a permanent, albeit lower, tariff regime or watch their export competitiveness evaporate. Under this duress, a breakthrough was announced on February 2, 2026. According to U.S. officials, in exchange for India committing to stop Russian oil imports and purchasing $500 billion in U.S. energy, technology, and defense products, the U.S. agreed to roll back tariffs from 50% to an “interim” rate of 18%.

While Indian officials acknowledged the trade deal and welcomed the tariff cuts, they did not officially accept the American version of its commitments to purchase these products or completely halt Russian oil imports. The 25% punitive duty related to Russian oil was removed after this announcement by an Executive Order on February 7, 2026. This left only the 25% “reciprocal” tariff in place—until the Supreme Court struck it down.

The Supreme Court ruled 6–3 that IEEPA does not grant the President the power to “adjust imports” through taxes or tariffs. The Court emphasized that the power to tax—which includes tariffs—belongs exclusively to Congress under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. By applying the “major questions doctrine,” the Court argued that such a massive shift in economic authority requires clear congressional authorization, which IEEPA lacks.

The ruling effectively invalidates the very foundation of the “Liberation Day” tariffs. Because the reciprocal tariffs were levied under IEEPA authority, they are now legally void.

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The gamble that paid off

While countries like the U.K. Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Argentina and Taiwan signed trade agreements in 2025 to secure “exemptions” from these tariffs, India’s refusal to rush into a trade deal with Washington now looks strategically astute. By holding out, India avoided locking itself into a deal signed under duress to escape a 50% threat that has now vanished.

Had India signed the deal, it might have been legally bound by treaty or executive agreement to the 18% rate, even after the underlying IEEPA tariffs were struck down. By delaying and remaining in the “almost ready” phase, India preserved its leverage. The country no longer needs to negotiate to escape a 50% penalty; it can now negotiate from a much better position.

Despite the ruling, President Trump remains defiant, stating that “The India deal is on.” However, the reality on the ground has shifted. When it was announced, the 18% tariff seemed like “relief.” In a post-ruling world, it looks like an unnecessary burden. If the 25% reciprocal tariff is illegal, India’s exports should technically face the much lower standard Most Favored Nation (MFN) rates.

Trump has attempted to bypass the Supreme Court ruling by announcing a new 10% global tariff under Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act, which allows temporary tariffs of up to 15% for 150 days. The immediate threat has thus fallen from 50% to 10%, weakening Washington’s leverage. The administration could also pivot to Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, or use other tools such as Sections 201 or 301 of the 1974 Trade Act. But all require formal investigations and findings, making them far more cumbersome. These procedural hurdles give New Delhi months of breathing room to negotiate from a position of strength.

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Even if the Trump administration seeks explicit Congressional authorization to restore presidential tariff authority, it is unlikely lawmakers would delegate powers as sweeping, flexible, and rapidly deployable as those previously claimed under IEEPA.

The fate of the ‘almost ready’ deal

The “almost ready” deal seems to be back on the drawing board. India will now likely adopt its time-tested policy of “wait and watch.” If the temporary tariff is the only legal weapon Trump has left, India might push for its 18% “agreed” rate to be slashed significantly. Furthermore, India could raise the issue of refund claims for exporters who paid duties under a regime now declared unlawful. This adds another layer to India’s changed position.

Regarding the insistence on halting Russian oil imports, that pressure was built on the threat of a 50% tariff. With that threat gone, New Delhi can re-examine its energy strategy, balancing its national interest against a weakened Washington.

Much will depend on how the Trump administration, U.S. Congress and Modi administration respond in the coming weeks. But for now, the collapse of emergency tariff authority has altered the negotiating landscape — and India appears better positioned than it did a few days ago. It might not have to choose now between the “Bad” (18%) and the “Worse” (50%), but between the “Pre-2025 Status Quo” and a fair partnership.

The Nobel Prizes, established by the will of Swedish industrialist and inventor Alfred Nobel, are widely regarded as the most prestigious awards given for intellectual achievement and contributions to humanity in the world. Among these, the Nobel Peace Prize holds a unique global significance. It is an extraordinary honor that contributes significantly to the global image, historical legacy, and domestic standing of the most powerful people in the world. It places them among a rare group of global figures such as Nelson Mandela, Dalai Lama, Theodore Roosevelt, and Barack Obama.

The Prize seems to hold even greater significance for U.S. President Donald Trump. He has often expressed frustration at not winning the award and openly questioned the Nobel Committee's past decisions, saying, ‘they only give Peace Prize to liberals (read democrats)’. His predecessor, Barack Obama, was awarded before he completed the first year of his presidency, which makes him a special target of Trump. This stands in stark contrast to most former presidents, who rarely, if ever, publicly campaigned for or complained about not winning the prize.

For Donald Trump, winning the Nobel would mean rewriting a century of its history, particularly for U.S. Presidents. To date, only four U.S. Presidents—Theodore Roosevelt (1906), Woodrow Wilson (1919), Jimmy Carter (2002), and Barack Obama (2009)—and one Vice President, Al Gore (2007), have been laureates. Notably, Theodore Roosevelt, awarded 119 years ago, stands as the sole Republican among them. In stark contrast, three of the four Democratic recipients have won the prize in the present century alone.

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Nobel moves

According to the will of Alfred Nobel, the Nobel Peace Prize is to be awarded to those who have "done the most or the best work for fraternity between nations, for the abolition or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses.

Donalds Trump's strongest argument for the Nobel Peace Prize centers around the Abraham Accords. These 2020 agreements between Israel and several Arab nations (UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco) were a significant diplomatic breakthrough. They fostered diplomatic ties in a historically volatile region and aligned directly with the Nobel Committee's aims of promoting "fraternity between nations." Trump actively took credit for these accords, presenting them as a testament to his peacemaking prowess and a clear basis for a Nobel nomination.

During his first term, Trump also held unprecedented direct talks with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un. This was a significast departure from previous US policy and clearly aligned with the Nobel Peace Prize’s criteria of 'fraternity between nations' and contributing to the 'abolition or reduction of standing armies' (or nuclear arsenals). However, nothing concrete was achieved from the talks and North Korea continued to develop its missile and nuclear programs.

Donald Trump’s pursuit of recognition, in his second term, extends to various recent and ongoing conflicts. With regard to the recent India-Pakistan conflict, Trump has repeatedly claimed credit for mediating a ceasefire between the two nuclear-armed rivals, even linking it to trade negotiations. Pakistan has publicly acknowledged Trump's efforts in ushering in the peace between the two nations and formally nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize.

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Trump has also frequently expressed his desire to broker a swift end to the Russia-Ukraine war (in just 24 hours). For him, ending such a major European conflict, with its immense global implications, would undoubtedly be framed as a monumental peace achievement. While nothing seems to have worked on this front, many link Trump’s continued insistence on a quick, personally mediated peace to his desire for the Nobel Peace Prize.

More recently, what happened during the Israel-Iran conflict might also provide insights into this dynamic. Following recent U.S. authorised strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and a swift "ceasefire" declared by Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize.

This presents an interesting hypothetical scenario: Could Trump have offered all-out support to Israel if Netanyahu agreed to de-escalate the conflict on his terms once certain Israeli goals were achieved? This arrangement would have been a win-win for both, allowing Israel to quickly navigate a complex conflict and enabling Trump to present himself as a strong contender for the Nobel Peace Prize.

The newly brokered Rwanda and Congo-Kinshasa peace agreement further underscores Donald Trump’s desire for the Nobel. While hosting the signing of the agreement in the Oval Office, Trump took sole credit for ‘achieving peace where no previous U.S. president had succeeded’. He also said that he deserved a Nobel prize for his efforts in securing the peace deal.

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The Roadblocks

Despite Donald Trump's repeated assertions that he should have received the Nobel Peace Prize at least four or five times, several factors complicate his Nobel aspirations.

History tells us that the Peace Prize has been awarded for lesser peace deals than the Abraham Accords brokered by Donald Trump. The 1978 prize to Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat for the Camp David Accords, or the 1994 prize to Yasser Arafat, Shimon Peres, and Yitzhak Rabin for the Oslo Accords, shows that direct peace agreements, even if incomplete or with ongoing challenges, are highly valued.

Signed around the same time, Trump's mediated 'Kosovo and Serbia economic normalisation agreements' should also have boosted his chances for the Nobel Peace Prize. However, he did not receive it, likely because the Nobel Committee often makes a holistic judgment. His other actions created a mixed record that might have outweighed even a strong accomplishment like the Abraham Accords.

Trump’s first administration pursued an "America First" policy that led to America’s withdrawals from the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA), the Paris Climate Accord, and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. He also withdrew from the UNHRC and the WHO.

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This unilateral behaviour of Trump was also reflected in his persistent push for the construction of a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border and his strained relations with the United States’ traditional allies. Critics believe that Donald Trump's actions undermined 'fraternity between nations' and multilateral cooperation, which are core tenets of the Peace Prize.

Trump's refusal to accept the 2020 election results and his encouragement of rioting at Capitol Hill can also be seen as undermining the very foundations of peace.

The recent India-Pakistan conflict and subsequent ceasefire presented Trump with almost as big an opportunity as the Abraham Accords. However, India's consistent rejection of any third-party mediation in the ceasefire poses a direct obstacle to his claim of having resolved the conflict. For someone as focused on personal credit and recognition as Trump, this refusal to acknowledge his supposed role could be seen as a direct affront. Adding to this, Trump’s personal business dealings with Pakistan and his nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize by them make the situation even more intriguing. This may explain Trump’s sudden disregard for Indian sensitivities and interests and his growing political affection for Pakistan.

The peace agreement between Rwanda and Congo-Kinshasa also has several 'ifs and buts,' particularly considering the U.S.'s involvement in securing mineral rights in Congo. Trump sees global peace-making less as a goal in itself and more as a means of personal validation and transactional advantage. This makes his version of “peace” quite different from past laureates.

Donald Trump appears to be applying a similar, transactional formula to the Ukraine war, offering America’s support in enforcing peace between Ukraine and Russia in exchange for various considerations. Whether peace efforts driven by such transactional interests truly embody the spirit of the Nobel Peace Prize remains a significant question.

Donald Trump’s divisive rhetoric and unilateral tariff wars — even with U.S. allies — stand in stark contrast to the traditional image of a Nobel Peace Prize laureate. His actions such as shutting down USAID, which delivered crucial aid to vulnerable regions, also clash with the humanitarian ideals the award is meant to honour.

Beyond these challenges, serious personal controversies, such as those involving the Epstein issue, could further damage a leader's prospects. Allegations involving exploitation or criminal conduct directly contradict the core values of dignity and moral leadership that the Nobel Peace Prize aspires to uphold.

Considering everything discussed in this article, the Nobel Peace Prize seems to be a distant and unrealizable dream for Donald Trump. But miracles do happen when the stakes are sky high.

Of the Nobel Prizes, five are selected by Swedish organizations, and one (the Peace Prize) by the Norwegian Nobel Committee, appointed by the Parliament of Norway. Both of these countries are in Europe, a continent that has appeared powerful and prosperous largely due to continuous American support since World War II. That support, however, is not guaranteed under a Trump administration.

Given Donald Trump’s penchant for personal recognition, could a Nobel Peace Prize be leveraged to ensure that support? After all, such an award could boost 'fraternity' between America and the countries of the European Union, bringing a sense of security and calm, precisely why the Nobel Peace Prize was instituted.

When the G7 last gathered in Canada in June 2018, President Donald Trump stunned America’s allies by refusing to sign the joint statement and calling for Russia’s readmission to the group, despite its 2014 annexation of Crimea. That moment marked the beginning of an uneasy phase in US-Europe relations which eased during Joe Biden’s presidency. But Trump’s return to the White House in 2024 brought back familiar tensions — and perhaps made them worse.

At the 2025 G7 Summit, again in Canada, Donald Trump reiterated that removing Russia from the group was a mistake and argued that its presence in the G7 could have prevented the war in Ukraine. He skipped key meetings including with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and suggested that Vladimir Putin might serve as a mediator in the Middle East conflict. Throughout the Summit, Trump openly showed his friendly feelings toward the Russian leader, and played down allies' plans for tougher sanctions on Russia.

Just a few weeks before the 2025 G7 Summit, on the issue of tariffs, Trump treated his strongest allies—the European Union and Canada—with the same transactional hostility he often directs toward adversaries.

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This makes us ask: would Europe have been in a stronger position to navigate Trump’s unpredictability and Russia’s war in Ukraine if the UK had remained in the EU?

Here are five reasons why many analysts believe the answer is yes:

1. Amplified diplomatic & economic leverage

An European Union including the United Kingdom could have formed a stronger, more cohesive bloc. This enhanced diplomatic and economic influence would have provided greater leverage to counter Trump’s unilateral actions and Russia’s aggression. A more integrated European market would have been less reliant on the United States for its stability and for providing military and financial support to Ukraine.

2. Internal distraction and economic uncertainties

Brexit negotiations consumed immense political capital, time, and resources for both the UK and the EU for several years. This prolonged diversion weakened Europe’s ability to address rising global challenges. Unburdened by Brexit's economic uncertainties and costs, the European economy would have possessed greater overall resilience to absorb shocks from events like the pandemic, tariffs, and the Ukraine crisis.

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3. Enhanced transatlantic coordination

The UK traditionally acted as a bridge between Washington and Brussels, helping mediate transatlantic tensions and harmonize positions on security, trade, and diplomacy. Its absence from the EU arguably removed a key intermediary, making coordination between the US and Europe tougher. If the UK had stayed, it might have softened the impact of some of Trump's actions, or at least helped his allies stand stronger together at meetings like the G7.

4. Ideological balance and strategic direction

The UK’s presence within the EU added an important balancing force, often championing economically liberal policies, assertive foreign policy, and EU expansion. Its departure disrupted this balance, subtly shifting the EU’s strategic posture at a time of rising global threats. Had Britain remained, Europe might have maintained a more cohesive, assertive, and geopolitically agile approach — better equipped to manage both Trump’s unpredictability and Russian aggression.

5. Counterarguments, but…

Some argue Brexit nudged the EU toward expanding its independent defence capabilities, since the UK often preferred NATO over a stronger EU military role. That could pay off in the long run. But in the short term, losing Britain meant losing one of Europe’s strongest military and diplomatic players — precisely when it was needed most. True, being outside the EU allows the UK to act faster on certain issues. Still, history shows that when it comes to managing major crises, a united European front is almost always more effective than going it alone.

When the Directors General of Military Operations (DGMOs) of India and Pakistan spoke on May 10, 2025, and agreed to a ceasefire after four days of escalating conflict, neither country announced it immediately. It was Donald Trump who first broke the news on social media, followed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Only then did India and Pakistan confirm the ceasefire — each framing it differently. While Pakistan publicly thanked Trump, India made no mention of America’s role.

This sequence raises an obvious question: why did the Trump administration initially stay out of Indo-Pak ceasefire efforts, only to suddenly claim credit? That indifference was clear just two days earlier when US Vice President JD Vance declared that America wouldn’t intervene in a conflict “that is fundamentally none of our business.” Yet after the ceasefire, Vance posted on Twitter: “Great work from the President’s team, especially Secretary Rubio.”

The answer lies in a mix of foreign policy compulsions and domestic political calculations. Here’s a breakdown.

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1. Failure to broker peace in Ukraine

Trump’s second presidency began with high-profile promises to deliver what his predecessors could not: a negotiated settlement in Ukraine. Yet, for all its public statements and private diplomacy, the administration fell short of achieving even a limited ceasefire between Kyiv and Moscow. The diplomatic setback damaged Trump’s image as a leader capable of striking tough deals. Seizing credit for brokering peace between India and Pakistan — two nuclear-armed nations with a historically volatile relationship — offered a chance to offset that failure and showcase a global ‘win’.

2. Erosion of U.S. Global Influence and Traditional Alliances

President Trump's "America First" doctrine has led to a marked decline in U.S. global influence. His administration's withdrawal from key international agreements and organisations—such as the Paris Climate Agreement, the WHO, and the UNHRC—has diminished America's role as a global leader. This retreat has created a vacuum that other nations, notably China, are eager to fill, positioning themselves as alternative leaders in global governance.

Simultaneously, Trump's transactional approach to international relations has strained long-standing alliances. Allies in Europe and elsewhere have expressed concerns over the U.S.'s commitment to collective security. In this context, the Indo-Pak ceasefire offered a rare opportunity for the U.S. to reassert its relevance and demonstrate a measure of commitment to engaging in matters of global consequence.

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3. Novice foreign policy team

One of the most widely noted features of Trump’s second term has been the composition of his foreign policy team. With figures like Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Vice President JD Vance holding key roles, and Trump himself historically disinterested in subtle diplomatic maneuvering, the administration has shown a preference for bold, headline-grabbing moves over careful back-channel negotiations. The decision to initially stay out of visible ceasefire efforts likely stemmed from a fear of diplomatic missteps in a conflict as sensitive and layered as India-Pakistan. Claiming credit after the fact carried none of those risks.

4. Domestic electoral optics

With the US midterm elections scheduled for November 2026, the Trump administration is under pressure to deliver high-visibility successes that can galvanise its base and shape public perception of American strength. Foreign policy wins — particularly those that don’t require troop deployments or financial commitments — serve as effective political capital. Additionally, claiming credit for a South Asian ceasefire also offered Trump’s team a chance to appeal to influential diaspora communities in key battleground states like Michigan, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Florida, where Indian American and Pakistani American voters could affect Congressional races.

Donald Trump’s stance on the Russia-Ukraine war has multiple layers, but two key factors seem to influence it the most: his personal affinity for Russian President Vladimir Putin and his dislike for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. These personal dynamics, combined with other factors, have shaped his position in ways that diverge from traditional U.S. foreign policy. While President Joe Biden has strongly supported Ukraine in its defense against Russian aggression, Trump has repeatedly downplayed the need for U.S. involvement and has been reluctant to criticize Putin. But why?

Donald Trump’s admiration for Vladimir Putin

Recently, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the United States. After his meeting with President Donald Trump, they addressed a press conference where Trump was asked: “How do you see this relationship between India and the United States in countering China? And what is your vision when it comes to India brokering peace in the Ukraine-Russia conflict?”

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In India, Trump’s response largely went unnoticed, but for those who paid attention, it was baffling. He replied, “Well, I think we are going to have a very good relationship with China… I got along with President Xi very, very well. We were very close, as leaders go.” He further added, “I think China is a very important player in the world. I think they can help us get this war over with Ukraine and Russia.”

Instead of addressing how India and the U.S. could counter China, Trump spoke about strengthening ties with Beijing, boasting about his personal rapport with Xi Jinping. And when asked about India’s role in the Ukraine-Russia conflict, he instead mentioned China as a potential mediator.

For those familiar with Trump’s worldview, this was not surprising. One of the most striking aspects of his foreign policy has been his fascination with authoritarian leaders. He has frequently praised Russian President Vladimir Putin, calling him a “strong” and “savvy” leader. Even after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Trump described Putin’s tactics as “genius,” though he later clarified that he did not support the war itself.

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Donald Trump has always admired strongmen who wield absolute control over their countries. Whether it’s Xi Jinping, Kim Jong-un, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, or Vladimir putin, he sees authoritarian rule as a mark of strength and decisiveness. Unlike democratic leaders who must contend with political opposition and institutional checks, Trump views Putin as someone who can make bold decisions without interference—something he himself prefers.

For decades, the Republican Party maintained a staunchly anti-Russian stance, shaped by Cold War geopolitics. However, Trump reshaped this approach, guided by his personal, political, and ‘ideological’ preferences. He repeatedly downplayed Russia’s interference in the 2016 election, often siding with Putin over American intelligence agencies. This shift was starkly evident at the 2018 Helsinki summit, where Trump, standing beside Putin, dismissed U.S. intelligence findings, stating: “President Putin says it's not Russia. I don't see any reason why it would be.” The remark stunned U.S. officials and reinforced concerns that Trump placed more trust in Putin’s assurances than in his own intelligence community.

Trump’s political style closely aligns with Putin’s interests. He has long criticized the U.S. foreign policy establishment, which traditionally views Russia as a geopolitical threat. He has also dismissed NATO as outdated and ineffective and threatened to withdraw the U.S. from it—echoing Russia’s objective of weakening Western unity. Additionally, Trump frequently attacks Western elites, the media, and international institutions, mirroring Putin’s hostility toward Western democratic structures. Trump and right-wing allies like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán share Putin’s hardline views on immigration, LGBTQ+ rights, and ultraconservative policies.

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According to some experts, Trump’s admiration for Putin isn’t just about ideology or shared interests—it’s also about how Putin personally engages with him. Vladimir Putin is a master at psychological manipulation, and he understands Trump’s deep need for praise and validation. While many Western leaders challenged Trump or treated him as unpredictable, Putin took a different approach—flattering him, appealing to his ego, and portraying their relationship as one between two 'strong' leaders. This kind of treatment likely played a role in shaping Trump’s perception of Putin.

Speculation persists that Putin may hold some form of leverage over Trump. While no concrete evidence supports this claim, reports such as the Steele Dossier (an unverified intelligence document) suggested that Russia might possess compromising material (kompromat) on Trump. Whether true or not, Trump’s reluctance to criticize Putin—even when Russia engaged in aggressive actions such as poisoning opposition leaders or suppressing protests—only reinforced suspicions that he feared antagonizing the Russian leader.

Donald Trump’s dislike for Volodymyr Zelensky

Donald Trump’s strained relationship with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky dates back to the Ukraine scandal of 2019, which led to Trump’s first impeachment (making him the third U.S. president ever to be impeached and the first to be impeached twice). In a now-infamous phone call, Trump allegedly pressured Zelensky to investigate Joe Biden and his son, Hunter Biden, in exchange for U.S. military aid and a White House invitation. Junior Biden had served on the board of Ukrainian energy conglomerate Burisma Holdings, and Trump alleged that Joe Biden, as Vice President, used his position to benefit both the company and his son. However, Zelensky refused to engage in U.S. domestic politics. While the transcript of the call showed Zelensky agreeing to investigate corruption broadly, he did not explicitly commit to targeting the Bidens.

Trump saw this refusal as a betrayal. Rather than complying with his request, Zelensky focused on strengthening Ukraine’s ties with the U.S. Congress and other American political leaders who were more supportive of Ukraine. This further soured Trump’s perception of him, leading Trump to view Zelensky as ungrateful, disloyal, and even an obstacle to his personal and political ambitions.

Under Joe Biden, Ukraine received unprecedented support from the United States, with the administration providing over $75 billion in military, financial, and humanitarian aid. Some believe Zelensky’s refusal to comply with Trump’s 2019 demands strengthened his credibility with U.S. leaders, helping Ukraine secure strong backing under the Biden administration. Biden knew how Zelensky resisted Trump’s pressure and refused to launch a politically motivated investigation against him. This may have strengthened Biden’s trust in Zelensky, making it easier for Ukraine to receive support under his administration.

This shift may also have fueled Trump’s animosity toward Zelensky. Biden’s approach to Ukraine was a direct reversal of Trump’s policies—where Trump delayed military aid and questioned Ukraine’s strategic value, Biden strengthened the U.S.-Ukraine relationship, making Ukraine a central focus of U.S. foreign policy. This contrast further highlighted Trump’s isolationist “America First” stance. Additionally, Trump has repeatedly dismissed aid to Ukraine as a waste of American taxpayer money. Trump’s hostility toward Biden and his opposition to liberal policies likely deepened his disdain for Zelensky, who became a key U.S. ally under Biden.

Justin Trudeau’s unexpected resignation as Liberal Party leader has thrown Canada’s political future into flux. After nine years in power, his declining popularity, internal party dissent, and pressures from Donald Trump’s looming economic policies led to his decision. Justin Trudeau himself acknowledged the uphill battle: “This country deserves a real choice in the next election,” he stated, signalling his belief that his leadership was no longer the best path forward.

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This resignation comes at a precarious time, with federal elections scheduled before October 2025 and public opinion polls suggesting that the Liberal Party would suffer a significant defeat to the Conservative Party led by Pierre Poilievre. The situation has prompted some to view this as a transformative moment in Canadian politics.

Donald Trump has often joked about Canada becoming part of the United States. While such musings might seem far-fetched, the rise of Pierre Poilievre as a strong contender for Prime Minister raises questions about the alignment of Canadian politics with Trump-style governance.

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Pierre Poilievre: Canada’s Donald Trump?

Pierre Poilievre has often been compared to Donald Trump, though opinions on the validity of this comparison vary. Poilievre’s political rhetoric, polarizing messages, and focus on appealing to disenchanted voters mirror Trump’s strategies. Both leaders share a knack for catchy slogans—Poilievre’s “Axe the Tax”, “Justinflation”, and ‘‘Liberals First or Canada First?’’ echo Trump’s “Make America Great Again”—and a disdain for traditional media and political elites.

However, their similarities extend beyond slogans. Like Trump, Poilievre has portrayed himself as a victim of the establishment, claiming to represent the “have-nots” against the “elites”. He also draws large, enthusiastic crowds, leveraging anger and discontent as powerful political tools. “Poilievre’s message is much more polarizing. He banks on anger, which is new in Canada,” observed Professor Genevieve Tellier of the University of Ottawa while talking to AFP.

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Despite surface similarities, there are notable differences in their policy priorities. Comparing their positions on three controversial issues—free trade, immigration, and foreign policy—highlights the contrast.

• Free Trade:
  Donald Trump’s presidency was marked by skepticism of free trade and the imposition of tariffs, including a renegotiation of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement). In contrast, Pierre Poilievre advocates for free trade and reducing international trade barriers, reflecting a pro-globalization stance within conservative boundaries.

• Immigration:
  While Trump’s immigration policy was characterized by hardline measures and divisive rhetoric, Poilievre’s approach is more measured. He ties immigration levels to housing availability, presenting it as a practical issue rather than a cultural or security concern.

• Foreign Policy:
  Donald Trump’s “America First” philosophy often translated into isolationism and non-interventionism. In contrast, Poilievre supports NATO’s stance on Ukraine and has criticized Trudeau for insufficient military aid to counter Russian aggression, marking a clear divergence in their foreign policy outlooks.

The Influence of Trumpism

While Poilievre’s policies may differ from Trump’s, his rise reflects a broader trend of Trump-style populism influencing global politics. This “Trumpism”—characterized by distrust of elites, polarizing rhetoric, and appeals to working-class frustrations—has found fertile ground in Canada too. Poilievre’s association with the 2022 trucker convoy protests against vaccine mandates is a clear example of this alignment.

This means that, if elected, Poilievre’s leadership could significantly reshape Canada’s domestic and international policies. His promise to “put Canada first” echoes Trump’s nationalist rhetoric, and his polarizing style and attacks on media and political opponents could erode the credibility of Canadian institutions—a phenomenon observed during Trump’s presidency.

Yet, some analysts believe that Pierre Poilievre’s approach is more pragmatic, less disruptive, and relatively “tame” compared to Donald Trump’s. His focus remains on economic issues such as cost-of-living concerns, housing shortages, and repealing the carbon tax, steering clear of the nativist or anti-immigrant rhetoric prevalent in other far-right movements.

This restraint may also be due to Canada’s political culture, which prevents him from embracing the more extreme elements of Trumpism. Analysts attribute this to “Canadian exceptionalism,” marked by a strong tradition of multiculturalism and public support for immigration. These factors have tempered the rise of far-right populism in Canada, making it unlikely that Poilievre would adopt Trump’s more divisive policies.

Whether Pierre Poilievre becomes Canada’s Prime Minister at the end of this year or not, and whether he behaves more like Trump or not, one thing is clear: Trump’s shadow looms very large over Canada. This influence is evident in Trudeau’s resignation, as Trump’s threats of 25% tariffs on Canadian goods were damaging enough. His repeated provocations about Canada becoming the “51st state” of the U.S. add further insult, undermining Canadian sovereignty in a manner even Pierre Poilievre finds hard to digest.

Poilievre’s rise also signals a shift in Canadian conservatism toward a more personality-driven, populist model. His consolidation of power within the Conservative Party and the bending of traditional party figures to his agenda is also reminiscent of Trump and his influence over the Republican Party. But unlike Trump’s bombastic and often erratic style, Poilievre’s brand of populism appears grounded in Canadian traditions of pragmatic conservatism—something that might set him apart in the eyes of Canadians and the world.