The Modi government has convened a special three-day session of Parliament from April 16–18, 2026. The stated objective is to amend the Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam (The 106th Constitutional Amendment Act) to fast-track the 33% reservation for women in the Lok Sabha by 2029.

However, a closer look at the timing and the legal fine print suggests that this move has less to do with gender justice and more to do with a strategic “delimitation” designed to secure a lopsided political advantage for the BJP.

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The first red flag is the schedule. The session is being held while West Bengal is in the middle of crucial assembly elections, with polling phases on April 23 and 29. By calling this session now, the government is forcing opposition MPs—particularly from the TMC—to choose between representing their constituents in Parliament or campaigning in their home state.

This isn’t just a logistical hurdle; it is a calculated attempt to disrupt the opposition’s momentum. If the government truly cared about the sanctity of the process, this exercise could easily have waited until after April 29.

When the Women’s Reservation Bill was passed in 2023, the law (under the newly inserted Article 334A) explicitly stated that reservation would only come into effect after two things happened:

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1. A new Census was conducted (post-2026).

2. A Delimitation (redrawing of constituency boundaries) was carried out based on that Census.

Now, the government is pivoting. They are reportedly seeking to bypass the wait for a new Census and use the 2011 Census data instead. Why the rush? The Registrar General has already indicated that a fresh Census could be completed by December 2027. By using 15-year-old data to redraw the map of India today, the government is signaling a desire to manipulate constituency boundaries to suit their 2029 electoral map.

Article 334A also says that delimitation can be carried out only for the purpose of implementing women’s reservation—that is, only to decide which seats will be reserved for women. However, the proposed amendment seeks to implement it through a “general delimitation” based on the old Census while also increasing the number of seats.

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This means that the government is using women’s empowerment as a shield for political engineering. We have already seen in Jammu and Kashmir and in Assam how delimitation was used for political purposes. No opposition can accept this.

The most dangerous aspect of this plan is that it would damage India’s federal structure. Delimitation carried out solely on the basis of population would completely upset the political balance between North and South India.

Consider the math: Uttar Pradesh currently has 80 Lok Sabha seats and Tamil Nadu has 39—a difference of 41. If delimitation is carried out as per the 2011 Census and the total number of seats is increased to the proposed maximum of 850, UP’s tally would jump to 140, while Tamil Nadu’s would only reach 51. The gap would widen from 41 to 89 seats.

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This essentially punishes Southern states for their success in population control and economic development. In a country as diverse as India, representation cannot be a numbers game that erases the voice of entire regions.

If the Prime Minister is genuinely concerned about the delay in women’s representation, the solution is simple: Grant 33% reservation within the existing 543 seats of the Lok Sabha today. All opposition parties would support such a move.

The fact that the government refuses to do this—and instead insists on a complex exercise—proves that the “Nari Shakti” narrative is merely a cover for a “Rajneetik” (Political) power grab. No member of the opposition should accept this assault on our federal structure. We must demand reservation without the strings of a biased delimitation attached.

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For a prime minister whose politics thrives on performance and nationalism, speaking in Hindi on the world stage is both identity and instrument. It also reflects a pragmatic reality — English is not a language in which Narendra Modi is most at ease. That should not be surprising in a country like India and, in fact, reflects the strength and inclusiveness of its democracy. But when it comes to international affairs, it might carry a cost.

When world leaders meet, what they say behind closed doors — the hints, jokes, reassurances, and quick clarifications — often matters as much as the formal communiqués that emerge later. Direct communication in a shared language is the most efficient path to trust. When someone understands both your words and the tone and non-verbal cues behind them, doubt diminishes, while comfort and credibility expand.

Narendra Modi’s public camaraderie with Donald Trump — from Houston’s “Howdy Modi” to Ahmedabad’s “Namaste Trump” — served clear political purposes for both men. These events created a spectacle of affinity. But can such orchestrated moments substitute the quieter, candid one-on-one diplomacy that happens when no one else is listening? Optics can be manufactured; genuine, unscripted conversation between two leaders, without any intermediaries, is far harder to replicate.

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In any communication, interpreters introduce friction. Nuances are filtered, jokes misfire, the rhythm of give-and-take slows. Diplomacy often advances in the interstices — the hallway chats, the phone calls, the whispered clarifications during discussions that never become public. Leaders who can pick up the phone and speak without an intermediary enjoy a kind of conversational currency. When conversation is mediated, that currency is downgraded. When we speak to someone only for transactional reasons achieving those very aims often becomes harder.

Paradoxically, the interpretative buffer can also be deliberately useful. In a press conference where a sensitive question lands, replying in Hindi and letting an interpreter render the answer creates a protective layer of insulation. Follow-ups are less likely, and small slips or nuances can be managed. That tactical opacity has value. But when persuasion is the goal — moving a foreign audience, convincing a skeptical counterpart — intermediation dilutes impact. A carefully crafted, emotionally charged sentence from a leader like Narendra Modi invariably becomes flat prose when filtered through even the best interpreter.

There is also a psychological dimension to this. In India, English is more than a language — it is a social credential that often confers power, privilege, and influence. Narendra Modi, however, has built his authority on vernacular politics, drawing immense capital from speaking to the masses in their own tongues.

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Abroad, this strength turns into a subtle dissonance. Entering rooms filled with Western leaders, diplomats, and other power brokers — where English is the natural language of rapport and informal exchange — places Modi within the very elite world he has long positioned himself against. Speaking firmly in Hindi in such settings may be an assertion of identity, but it is also a marker of distance.

Such tension can produce two related behaviours. One is control: keeping interactions tightly scripted and choreographed to minimise the risk of conversational vulnerability. The other is compensation: substituting casual rapport with spectacle — the long hugs, dramatic handshakes, and public declarations of friendship.

For leaders such as Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, or Japan’s prime ministers, the use of interpreters is routine and not seen as a diplomatic limitation. With Western leaders, however, the expectation of speaking freely in English is far stronger. For them, English is not merely the language of the developed world. It is a shared space of humour, cultural references, and everyday expressions. It helps build informal trust and personal rapport, not just exchange information.

Some leaders connect even without perfect English because they communicate tone and intent with clarity. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is a striking example. His English may be imperfect, but his body language, directness, emotional openness, and ease with imperfection make him as effective as even the most powerful native speaker.

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Atal Bihari Vajpayee offers a more instructive Indian contrast. Like Modi, he was a Hindi orator of rare grace, but he never treated English as an adversary. When addressing Western audiences or meeting American presidents, his English — careful, measured, and occasionally poetic — conveyed both confidence and ease. He moved comfortably between two linguistic worlds without losing authenticity.

So did Late Sushma Swaraj, whose English was as mellifluous as her Hindi. Though she served as Minister of External Affairs in Modi’s first government, she was never truly deployed to her full potential on the global stage.

Contrast this with Shashi Tharoor, who, during the aftermath of Operation Sindoor, when India seemed to be losing the information battle to Pakistan, almost single-handedly articulated India’s position with remarkable clarity and eloquence, winning over global audiences through the sheer force of his language and intellect.

Vajpayee’s bilingual poise gave him a diplomatic reach Modi could have achieved had he chosen to cultivate that register. Modi’s Hindi oratory connects powerfully with his domestic audience, but on the international stage, the lack of linguistic ease can subtly tilt the scales of perception.

It is telling how Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif became something of a blue-eyed boy for Donald Trump. Sharif holds only nominal authority at home, but he has an instinct for flattery — one he delivers smoothly in fluent English. The result was on display at the recent Sharm el-Sheikh peace summit, where, among some of the world’s most powerful leaders, Sharif was the only one Trump invited to speak midway through his own address. The episode underscores how charm and linguistic ease can, in the theatre of diplomacy, sometimes outweigh formal power.

Why, then, has Modi not leaned more heavily into English? One explanation is practical. Limited early exposure makes it difficult to develop the kind of effortless fluency required for quick, spontaneous exchanges under pressure. Another is political. His public persona draws strength from vernacular authenticity. Polished English could soften the image of the anti-elite outsider. And embracing the language of the former coloniser risks weakening a nationalist narrative rooted in cultural self-assertion.

When Modi proudly speaks in Hindi before global leaders, it may not be only about identity, nationalism, or lack of English proficiency. His home audience understands every word, foreign leaders don’t. That gap can be turned to advantage. He can deliver lines that sound stirring to Indians, enhancing his image as a global strongman, while the interpreter renders them in a restrained, diplomatically correct English for the world to hear.

But what empowers domestically can isolate internationally. Vajpayee demonstrated how one could carry the cadence of Hindi and the clarity of English with equal grace. Benjamin Netanyahu moves between Hebrew and English with strategic ease. Finland’s President Alexander Stubb exercises influence beyond his country’s size in part through his eloquence in English. Zelenskyy, meanwhile, uses his imperfect English to mobilise sympathy and solidarity for his war-torn nation. Each illustrates how bilingualism can become a diplomatic asset.

Major strategic deals rarely hinge on a single private call. They are the product of sustained bureaucratic effort and tough negotiation. Yet informal, trust-based exchanges can be invaluable. When India’s top leadership must rely on intermediaries in critical diplomatic moments, it sacrifices a small but sometimes decisive margin of soft influence — the kind that can turn a “let’s study this” into a “let’s do this now.”

This is not to say Modi has been ineffective. His Hindi oratory resonates with a billion people and signals confidence in India’s culture which matters. But it also narrows the space for personal diplomacy, limiting the subtle, trust-based influence that bilingual leaders often wield on the world stage.

1. Reply out of turn

The Election Commission’s first public reaction to Rahul Gandhi’s press conference (PC) was notable as much for its timing as for its content. Gandhi was still midway through his 70-minute briefing — having just finished the main part — when the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) of Karnataka posted a letter in response to his allegations on social media. Shortly afterwards, similar statements came from the CEOs of Haryana and Maharashtra, all quickly echoed by the EC’s own official account.

The speed alone suggests this could not have been a considered reply to Gandhi’s detailed allegations. The content reinforced that impression. For example, at one place it states, “It is understood that during a Press Conference held today, you had mentioned about the inclusion of ineligible electors and exclusion of eligible electors in the Electoral Rolls…”

This is factually incorrect. Had the EC listened carefully before writing its response — or simply waited until Gandhi finished — it likely would not have done that. In the later part of his briefing, Rahul specifically mentioned,“we have only shown voter addition (inclusion of ineligible electors). There is also something called voter subtraction (exclusion of eligible electors). We know that it is almost of the same scale, but, we haven’t got the data to assert that, so, we are not talking about.”

Rather than engaging with the core issues or showing any intent to address them, the EC’s response clearly looks like what it likely was — a hastily drafted, centrally co-ordinated standard bureaucratic note, leaning on unnecessary technicalities. The urgency seemed less about fact-finding and more about seizing control of the narrative before it could take shape in the public mind.

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2. Technicality as tactic

The Karnataka CEO’s letter invited Gandhi to submit his allegations via a sworn affidavit under Rule 20(3)(b) of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960. On paper, this might seem like a legitimate step. In practice, as senior advocate Kapil Sibal has pointed out, it is a procedural cul-de-sac.

Rules 12 to 20 cover claims and objections for the inclusion and exclusion of names in and from the electoral rolls. Rule 12 imposes a 30-day limit from the draft’s publication for lodging claims and objections. And Rule 17 mandates that any claim or objection filed after this period “shall be rejected”. Rule 20 simply prescribes how such claims and objections are to be filed and examined.

In this case, the 2024 electoral rolls had been finalised months before Gandhi’s 7 August 2025 press conference. That makes Rule 20(3)(b) inapplicable even for a single claim or objection, let alone post-poll systemic fraud allegations by the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha. Even if Gandhi complied, the EC could reject it outright under Rule 17 as “out of time”.

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3. Discretion as weapon

The affidavit format attached to the Karnataka CEO’s letter requires Gandhi to list, for each disputed voter, the name, the part number of the electoral roll, and the serial number in that roll.

Considering Gandhi’s allegation of over 1,00,000 suspicious entries in Mahadevapura, meeting this demand would require manually recording each detail — a bureaucratic marathon bordering on the absurd.

And this is not only inapplicable here but also legally unnecessary. Rule 20(3)(b) says that “The registration officer may in his discretion require that the evidence tendered by any person shall be given on oath and administer an oath for the purpose.” The four words — “may in his discretion” — make clear the affidavit is an optional requirement, not a legal necessity. The EC could just as well accept a simple paper submission.

Section 31 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 criminalises false declarations on electoral rolls. Section 227 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Samhita, 2023 also does the same. This means even a tiny percentage of clerical errors — inevitable at this scale — could expose Gandhi to criminal prosecution. As former CEC O.P. Rawat noted, this could well be why the EC insisted on an oath in Gandhi’s case.

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4. The lose-lose logic

The EC’s “invitation” to file an affidavit creates a façade of openness while boxing Gandhi into a lose-lose situation. If he filed, he risked legal jeopardy from inevitable mistakes, or dismissal of his complaint on the purely technical ground of being late. If he refused, the Commission could claim he was unwilling to lodge a “proper” complaint — painting him as someone making baseless allegations.

This framing was reinforced in the EC’s follow-up statements of 8 June 2025, which repeatedly argued that:

a) If Shri Rahul Gandhi believes in his analysis and in the truth of his allegations against election staff, he should have no objection to filing claims and objections against specific voters, and signing the Declaration/Oath under Rule 20(3)(b) of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960.

b) If Shri Rahul Gandhi refuses to sign the Declaration, it shows he does not believe in his own analysis or conclusions, and is making absurd allegations — in which case he should apologise to the nation.

5. Discretion over transparency

The EC also addressed Gandhi’s demand for a machine-readable voter list, bluntly stating that “INC plea of providing machine-readable voter list was rejected by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kamal Nath vs ECI, 2019.”

This is technically correct — the Supreme Court upheld the EC’s refusal to provide such lists, citing privacy concerns — but the ruling only says the EC is not obliged to provide them. It does not forbid the Commission from doing so.

In other words, the decision remains entirely at the EC’s discretion, provided privacy safeguards are applied. The EC could retain image-PDFs for public display while granting controlled, audited machine-readable access to recognised parties or accredited auditors — with sensitive fields redacted, usage logged, and misuse penalised. That would protect privacy while ensuring transparency, if the EC chose to allow it.

Regarding Rahul’s demand for CCTV footage, the EC said in its response:

"Any aggrieved candidate can file an election petition (EP) to challenge his election in the concerned High Court within 45 days. If an EP is filed, CCTV footage is retained; otherwise, it serves no purpose — unless someone intends to breach voter privacy."

Then it adds something that again borders on the absurd:

"For example, reviewing CCTV footage from 1 lakh polling stations would take 1 lakh days — that’s approximately 273 years — with no legal outcome possible."

It is pertinent to note here that just after the Maharashtra elections, the Ministry of Law amended the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 on the EC’s advice. This effectively shut the door on any attempt to inspect CCTV footage of polling booths. And in June 2025, the EC went a step further, instructing its officials to destroy CCTV, webcasting, and video footage of the election process after 45 days.

After becoming President, Donald Trump chose the Middle East for his first official foreign visit. Held from May 13 to 16, the trip unfolded with considerable fanfare. While diplomacy and official business took place on one side, reports of the rapid expansion of Trump’s private business empire in the Middle East were also making headlines.

While Trump touted the U.S.'s multi-trillion-dollar agreements with Middle Eastern governments, media reports highlighted a parallel stream of ethically questionable financial deals — all, in one way or another, connected to him. These reports mentioned a $5.5 billion Trump-branded golf resort in Doha backed by the Qatari government, a $1 billion Trump hotel in Dubai, and several new real estate agreements involving Trump-affiliated companies in Saudi Arabia.

A company linked to the UAE royal family, MGX, struck a deal to purchase cryptocurrency worth 2 billion dollars just ahead of Trump’s visit. The cryptocurrency, called USD1, is issued by a company named World Liberty Financial. Donald Trump is one of the co-founders of this firm, and the largest stake in it is held by his family.

The key figures running the company include Eric Trump, Donald Trump Jr., Barron Trump, and Jack Witkoff. Witkoff is the son of Steven Witkoff, who serves as the Trump administration’s Middle East envoy. In other words, while senior Trump and Witkoff have been shaping America’s relations with the UAE, their children have been busy expanding their family businesses there.

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Right after the Pahalgam terrorist attack, a Pakistani government body — the Pakistan Crypto Council — also signed a major agreement with World Liberty Financial. This agreement raises serious questions about the shift in Donald Trump’s behavior during the India-Pakistan conflict. Initially, Trump appeared largely indifferent, but later, he essentially ended up siding with Pakistan.

World Liberty Financial has rapidly emerged as one of the fastest-growing — and arguably the most controversial — cryptocurrency firms in the world. Reports suggest that not only do its investors reap profits, but so do the associates of the companies it chooses to invest in.

When it comes to Donald Trump’s business dealings, the complete picture may remain elusive. Yet, what the available evidence makes unmistakably clear is this: the American President has shown no qualms about using political power to expand his personal empire, with little regard for conflicts of interest.

Political leaders with business interests are nothing new. Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi, the Philippines’ Ferdinand Marcos, and more recently Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have all faced allegations of leveraging state power for personal enrichment. What sets Donald Trump apart, however, is not just the brazenness of doing this in a country like America, but his ability to recast it as entrepreneurial leadership — turning impropriety into political currency. He elevates this conduct to a different league, not merely in scale but by openly making it part of his political persona. This, from the same man who, during his first term, routinely accused Hunter Biden of profiting off the Biden family name in dealings with Ukraine and China.

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Trump’s conduct while in office laid bare the inherent dangers of a direct convergence between politics and business. It creates an uneven playing field where business rivals are structurally disadvantaged, and public policy is shaped not by national interest, but by personal commercial gain. Worse, it extends beyond national borders, compelling other nations to cut big ticket business deals — not with America, but with Trump Inc.

The deeper issue here is this: if such practices can take root in America — a country that for decades positioned itself as the world’s arbiter of democratic values — what stops them from thriving elsewhere? The United States, for all its flaws, still has a culture of independent journalism, watchdog bodies, and robust legal protections for the press. Yet even there, it happened. If it can happen in Washington, it certainly can happen, in the nations where political literacy is uneven, institutions are fragile, and checks on power are weak.

In India, we have already witnessed a worrying convergence of wealth and political influence. While substantial, it remains largely indirect for now. Major business houses provide hefty donations to political parties and cultivate close ties with influential leaders. But taking inspiration from Donald Trump, the nature of this relationship could change, echoing the direct control that has occurred within India's media.

Entities like Reliance and the Adani Group have significant control over India’s current media landscape. This ownership is not merely economic—it allegedly shapes editorial lines, stifles dissenting voices, and influences public opinion in ways that favor their interests. What started as friendships between business and media figures and the practice of paid news has, over the last decade, grown into direct ownership and editorial capture.

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The next logical step may be business magnates seeking direct political power, armed with control over information, resources, and public narratives.

Why defer to a leader, when you can be one?

The question is no longer if it could happen, but what stops it—and why.

In India, we’ve often seen allegations of politicians’ children benefiting from business deals and contracts during their parents’ tenure. But consider this: Mukesh Ambani and Gautam Adani are far wealthier than Trump ever was. Their economic footprint spans critical sectors—telecom, infrastructure, ports, energy, and media. If one of them, or someone similarly positioned, chose to enter politics directly under the banner of ‘efficient leadership’ or ‘entrepreneurial governance,’ the existing political system and players might be ill-equipped to challenge them.

Would voters reject such a move? Would institutions have the moral authority to oppose, when America itself allowed a billionaire to become president twice and openly use state power for personal gain? No democracy bars anyone from aspiring to lead. What’s truly alarming is how Trump is rapidly normalising the idea that the highest public office can serve as a tool for private empire-building, that conflicts of interest need not be concealed, but displayed as marks of success, and that public morality is negotiable if you’re rich and powerful enough.

The convergence of big money, media control, and political power has the potential to fundamentally reshape democracies. This threat can be far more insidious than overt coups or authoritarianism. It thrives in legal grey zones, exploits institutional weaknesses, and, most dangerously, gains public approval through nationalist rhetoric and the normalisation of impropriety.

The Trump model is not merely an American aberration. It represents a prototype for a new, global form of oligarchic democracy — one where billionaires no longer need to whisper in politicians’ ears, but can simply assume power themselves to advance their interests.

In the aftermath of the ghastly Pahalgam terror attack, India’s public mood has turned sharply aggressive. Demands for immediate military retaliation against Pakistan have dominated television debates and social media feeds, placing intense pressure on the government to act. Sections within the establishment too appeared to contribute to this heightened public mood. Yet, what many Indians have not fully realised is that India may have already delivered a far more consequential response — one that strikes at the heart of Pakistan’s long-term security, without firing a shot.

Among a series of diplomatic, economic, and strategic measures, the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty stands out. There’s a risk of it being dismissed as symbolic or routine, but it is arguably the single most significant strategic decision taken by India in the wake of the attack — one that has the potential to fundamentally reshape the India-Pakistan dynamic.

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Signed in 1960 under World Bank mediation, the Indus Water Treaty has long been considered one of the world’s most resilient water-sharing agreements, surviving wars and prolonged hostilities. Under its terms, India, as the upper riparian country, controls the three eastern rivers — Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej — while Pakistan has rights over the three western rivers — Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab. These rivers are the lifeline of Pakistan’s agriculture, economy, and drinking water supply.

What makes this treaty critical for Pakistan today is the country’s deepening water crisis. With one of the world’s lowest per capita water availability figures, Pakistan stands on the verge of officially being declared a water-scarce nation. Decades of poor management, over-extraction, and outdated irrigation infrastructure have worsened the problem. Equally troubling is Pakistan’s internal water conflict, with Punjab province — the upper riparian within Pakistan — historically diverting a disproportionate share of Indus waters, leaving downstream Sindh grappling with drought-like conditions for years.

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In this context, Pakistan’s political and military interest in Kashmir is not solely driven by ideological or territorial ambitions. It is closely tied to water security. Control over rivers flowing through Kashmir — the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab — is vital for sustaining Pakistan’s agricultural heartland and ensuring its food security. This often-underestimated factor adds a critical dimension to the Kashmir dispute.

The Indian government’s move to suspend the treaty, therefore, carries far greater strategic weight than is being acknowledged in India’s domestic discourse. Even if partial or symbolic, the very act of revisiting or threatening the terms of a treaty that has ensured uninterrupted water flows to Pakistan for over six decades sends a deeply unsettling signal to Islamabad. Yet, within India, the gravity of this move has not been fully registered. A significant section of public opinion, fuelled by prime-time rhetoric, continues to demand visible military action, mistakenly assuming that the government has done little in response.

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This is a dangerous misreading of the situation. If public anger and nationalist fervour continue unchecked, ignoring the significance of this strategic move, the government might find itself cornered into ordering a military strike to manage domestic expectations. In a region where both nations are nuclear-armed and tensions are habitually volatile, such a step risks triggering a conflict far more serious than what much of the current public discourse seems to comprehend.

The suspension of the treaty is not a token gesture. It is a calculated and high-stakes diplomatic lever — one that fundamentally alters the strategic balance without firing a shot. It signals to Pakistan that the price of continued proxy warfare will no longer be limited to border skirmishes and diplomatic condemnations. Water, the resource most vital to Pakistan’s survival, is now on the table.

At this juncture, what India needs most is restraint, clarity, and strategic patience — not just from its political leadership, but from its citizens. Recognising the gravity of the decision already taken, rather than clamouring for instant, visible retribution, is the wiser and more responsible course. Real strength lies in responding where it unsettles the adversary most, not where prime-time studios and trending hashtags demand. India has already acted decisively. The prudent, powerful thing now is to hold that line — and let quiet pressure speak louder than war.

In 1960, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru signed the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan. Under this agreement, India ceded the waters of three western rivers of the Indus system — the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab — to Pakistan. Together, these rivers accounted for nearly 75% of the total water volume of the entire Indus system. The remaining three eastern rivers — the Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi — were allocated for India’s use.

To help Pakistan build the infrastructure needed to utilise its share effectively, India also contributed £6.2 million to the Indus Basin Development Fund — an international financial arrangement supported by the U.S., U.K., Germany, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the World Bank.

Why did Jawaharlal Nehru agree to such a seemingly unequal treaty over rivers that originate in India? Based on expert views and historical records, here’s the explanation in five sharp points:

1. Cold War pressure

At the time, the United States and Britain were deeply invested in stabilising Pakistan as a Cold War ally against Soviet influence. The World Bank (IBRD), under pressure from the US and UK, was anything but neutral — it aligned itself with Western strategic priorities. The pressure on India to sign the Indus Waters Treaty and avoid a prolonged water conflict was immense.

India may also have been swayed by General Ayub Khan’s 1959 offer of “joint defence with India” amid deteriorating India–China relations. This was not out of concern for India’s security, but a reflection of Ayub’s alignment with the West — Pakistan was a member of both SEATO and CENTO, which viewed the Communist bloc, particularly the USSR and China, as the greatest threat to their existence.

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2. Fear of international isolation

Refusing a treaty risked India being painted as an aggressive, obstructive power, jeopardising its relations with Western powers and access to vital international loans, grants, and World Bank funding. Newly independent and economically fragile, India couldn’t afford diplomatic and economic isolation or the risk of another confrontation with Pakistan.

3. India’s idealistic vision of peace

Jawaharlal Nehru saw rivers as common natural resources meant for the collective good of humanity. India’s foreign policy establishment in the 1950s was also driven by a moralist, idealist, and anti-imperialist worldview. Hard-nosed realpolitik was then seen as an imperialist residue. This sounds naïve now — but within the Gandhian-Nehruvian moral framework, it was entirely consistent.

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4. A miscalculated bet on Pakistan

Scarred by the horrors of Partition, Nehru genuinely hoped the treaty would foster long-term peace and goodwill with Pakistan, viewing it as a diplomatic investment in regional stability. In fact, on 30 November 1960, he told the Lok Sabha, “We purchased a settlement, if you like; we purchased peace to that extent — and it is good for both countries.” Some experts believe he may also have thought that once relations normalised, India could renegotiate the arrangement on better terms. In hindsight, he clearly overestimated Pakistan’s long-term intentions and underestimated the strategic consequences of this concession.

5. India’s inability to harness its own waters

It was very difficult for India to divert the waters of the Indus system into its northern states because the mighty Pir Panjal mountain range stood in the way. In 1947, India also lacked the dams and infrastructure needed to store and use this water wherever possible before it flowed into Pakistan. Added to this were economic weakness, diplomatic pressure, and post-Partition instability, which made it politically impossible for India to avoid a quick settlement with Pakistan.

Renowned water resources expert and leader of the Indian delegation for the Indus Waters Treaty negotiations, Niranjan Das Gulhati, recalls in one of his books: “When I called on the Prime Minister (Jawaharlal Nehru) on 28th February 1961, my last day in office, in a sad tone he said, ‘Gulhati, I had hoped that this agreement would open the way to settlement on other problems, but we are where we were.’”

And that says it all.

In hindsight, the Indus Waters Treaty was less a treaty of equals and more a product of Cold War coercion, Nehruvian idealism, and India’s desperate post-Partition vulnerabilities. In reasserting itself today, India is not reneging on a legacy — it is trying to correct an imbalance history imposed upon it.

In the aftermath of the recent terror attack on innocent tourists in Pahalgam, senior advocate and Rajya Sabha MP Kapil Sibal has called for a serious, collective, and strategic response from India’s leadership. In a detailed statement, Sibal proposed a five-point action plan — ranging from a special session of Parliament to international diplomatic outreach, economic leverage, non-partisan unity against terror, and urgent completion of India’s border management infrastructure.

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1️⃣ Call a special session of parliament

Sibal urged the Prime Minister to immediately convene a special session of Parliament, bringing together all political parties to discuss this grave issue.

“This is not about politics — it’s an attack on India’s sovereignty. No innocent tourist deserves to die like this. The message must go out loud and clear that India stands united against terror.”

He recommended that a unanimous resolution be passed and communicated globally, reflecting the collective will of the Indian people and political leadership.

2️⃣ Launch a major diplomatic and UN initiative

Sibal proposed sending parliamentary delegations — including MPs from both the ruling party and the opposition — to major global capitals to build awareness about Pakistan’s persistent cross-border terror.

“Unless we proactively explain our situation to the world, and build diplomatic pressure on Pakistan and its backers, isolated actions won’t have the desired global impact.”

He specifically named the United States, Europe, Russia, China, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Africa, South America, and South Asian neighbours as key destinations for this outreach. He also outlined that, ‘in the present global economic scenario, China needs India’s market’, and this should be conditional on its behaviour on this issue in global forums such as the United Nations.

3️⃣ Use economic leverage against terror supporters

Sibal argued that India should strategically use its market power to pressure nations maintaining trade ties with Pakistan.

“India is one of the largest markets in the world. If major economies want access to our market, they must reconsider their trade ties with Pakistan until it stops sheltering terrorism.”

He cited how other nations, like the US, have historically used economic measures to serve strategic interests and urged India to do the same.

4️⃣ Keep terror above politics

Sibal warned against politicising terror incidents for electoral gains or indulging in divisive rhetoric.

“A terrorist is a terrorist — irrespective of religion. No political advantage should be drawn from tragedies like Pulwama. Such conduct only plays into Pakistan’s hands.”

He endorsed RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat’s call for national unity and urged leaders and the media to act with responsibility and restraint.

5️⃣ Complete the border management system on war footing

Referring to India’s decision in 2005 to fence the Indo-Pak border and the subsequent Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS) plan — delayed repeatedly since 2018 — Sibal stressed its immediate completion.

“We must use the latest surveillance and border technology. If Israel can detect infiltrators, why can’t we? The delays must end. All parties must support this financially and politically.”

He noted that although infiltration numbers have dropped from thousands to around 100–150, significant vulnerabilities remain, especially during harsh winters.

In response to queries about actions like suspending the Indus Waters Treaty, Sibal cautioned that such steps alone won’t curb terrorism.

He also expressed disappointment that Prime Minister Narendra Modi did not attend an all-party meeting on the issue — a departure from the precedent set by Atal Bihari Vajpayee during the Kargil conflict — suggesting that leadership must prioritise national unity over political engagements.

The official PM India website reports that Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid tribute to Mahatma Gandhi at his memorial on January 30. This is not unusual—since assuming office, he has consistently done this on Gandhi’s birth and death anniversaries. He also frequently describes Gandhi as a role model for the world. However, it would not be accurate to say that PM Modi’s supporters share his deep reverence for Gandhi.

Modi has millions of supporters, and their individual views on different matters should not necessarily be linked to him. However, some of these supporters openly call themselves his devoted followers. When the Prime Minister does not actively challenge these supporters’ views—or, in some cases, seems to support them in other matters—it further complicates the issue.

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For example, one of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s most prominent supporters, BJP MP from Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, Kangana Ranaut, has made statements that reflect this sentiment. On Mahatma Gandhi’s 120th birth anniversary, she even objected to calling him the “Father of the Nation.” A few years ago, she also made an unusual appeal, suggesting that one must choose between Mahatma Gandhi and Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose. At that time, she shared an old newspaper clipping on social media and wrote, “Either you are a Gandhi fan or Netaji supporter. You can’t be both. Choose and decide.”

Kangana’s statement is worth examining in more detail because Modi’s supporters often echo similar arguments in debates. Targeting Mahatma Gandhi, she further claimed that ‘Those who fought for the freedom were ‘handed over’ to their masters by those who had no courage burning/ boiling hot blood to fight their oppressors but they were power hungry and cunning…Those are the ones who taught us, if someone slaps you offer another cheek for one more slap and that is how you will get aazaadi. That's not how one gets aazadi, one can only get bheekh like that. Choose your heroes wisely." She further wrote that “Gandhi never supported Bhagat Singh or Netaji… there are evidence that suggest Gandhi ji wanted Bhagat Singh to be hanged… So you need to choose who you support because just placing them all in one box of your memory and every year wishing them all on their birth anniversaries is not enough. In fact, it is not just dumb, it is highly irresponsible and superficial… One must know their history and their heroes…”

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If we compare Kangana's statements to Narendra Modi’s words about Gandhi, the contrast is striking. For example, at the ‘Bhoomi Pujan’ ceremony for the Ram Temple, Modi spoke about Gandhi with great reverence. He said:

“Just as Dalits, backward classes, tribals, and people from all sections of society supported Gandhiji in the freedom struggle, in the same way, with the support of people across the country, this sacred work of constructing the Ram Temple has begun. … During the freedom struggle, Ram was present in Bapu’s hymns as the power of non-violence and Satyagrah. … The Father of the Nation, Mahatma Gandhi, envisioned Ram Rajya in the light of these very principles and mantras. Ram’s life and character themselves are the path to Gandhiji’s vision of Ram Rajya.”

Here, while mentioning the Father of the Nation, Mahatma Gandhi, the Prime Minister also seemed to be trying to establish that he is following the path shown by Gandhi and that the construction of the Ram Temple is a similar endeavor. In an event where the very organization of the program and Modi’s presence were enough to delight his supporters, the Prime Minister’s repeated references to Gandhi were particularly noteworthy.

This becomes even more significant because, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi was making these remarks, RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat and several other top RSS functionaries were present. Anyone with even a basic understanding of Indian politics knows how the RSS and its affiliates have historically maintained a distance from Gandhi. Moreover, many of the political figures, saints, and common people attending the Bhoomi Pujan ceremony were not necessarily known for their closeness to Mahatma Gandhi’s ideals. In this context, Modi’s repeated mention of Gandhi must have been surprising not only to his critics but also to his supporters.

But this was not the first time Prime Minister Narendra Modi publicly sought to associate himself with Mahatma Gandhi. Modi not only frequently invokes Gandhi’s name in his speeches but also promotes khadi and poses for photographs while spinning the charkha. Whenever an important foreign dignitary visits India, a trip to the Sabarmati Ashram with Prime Minister Modi is almost a given. He has taken numerous world leaders there, including Chinese President Xi Jinping, former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, U.S. President Donald Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.

Additionally, whenever Prime Minister Modi speaks on an international platform, he makes sure to mention Mahatma Gandhi. At the United Nations General Assembly, he highlighted Gandhi’s contributions to the freedom movement and his continued relevance today. On Gandhi’s 150th birth anniversary, Modi wrote an article for The New York Times, emphasizing why both India and the world still need Gandhi’s ideals. During the nationwide controversy and protests over the new citizenship law, Modi even defended it by claiming that it was Gandhi’s wish that Hindus from Pakistan who wanted to settle in India should always be welcomed.

During the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, while speaking to a media channel, Prime Minister Modi remarked that before the release of the film Gandhi, no one in the world knew about Mahatma Gandhi. Here, he was likely taking a dig at the Congress, implying that it had not done enough to spread Gandhi’s philosophy globally. According to critics, this statement was also a subtle attempt to portray himself as a true champion of Gandhi. Regardless of his intent, there is no doubt that he has been consistent in publicly acknowledging the power of Gandhi and his ideas.

However, among Modi’s supporters, there exists a strange contradiction regarding Gandhi. Even his staunchest followers—who otherwise unquestioningly believe in Modi—differ from him when it comes to Mahatma Gandhi. From BJP leaders to party workers and common supporters, many have been heard expressing disdain for Gandhi, using derogatory language against him, and even displaying outright hatred.

Take a few examples: A few years ago, a young BJP worker stirred controversy by claiming that India’s independence was granted on a 100-year lease. Many BJP supporters often repeat a similar narrative, seemingly inspired by BJP leader Anant Kumar Hegde, who dismissed Gandhi’s freedom movement as mere “drama.” Before that, Amit Shah, the current Home Minister and former BJP president, had referred to Gandhi as a “clever baniya” (a term for the trader caste). Meanwhile, BJP MP Pragya Thakur, standing in Parliament, went as far as calling Nathuram Godse—a convicted assassin of Gandhi—a “patriot.”

Last year, at an event celebrating Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s birth anniversary, popular Bhojpuri singer Devi Singh was forced to apologize for singing Gandhi’s favorite hymn, Vaishnav Jan To… The incident took place in Patna, with Union Minister Ashwini Choubey present at the event.

Among the most controversial statements made by BJP leaders regarding Gandhi, the most well-known ones come from national party spokesperson Sambit Patra and Haryana Cabinet Minister Anil Vij. While Patra referred to Prime Minister Modi as the “father” of the nation, Vij suggested removing Gandhi’s image from Indian currency. The impact of such statements is evident even today, as social media is frequently flooded with demands or predictions about declaring PM Modi as the new “Father of the Nation” and removing Gandhi’s image from banknotes. Modi’s supporters also routinely justify Gandhi’s assassination, question his character, and label him as an enemy of Hinduism.

Looking at the behavior of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s supporters, it often seems as though they either do not listen to him, do not believe what he says, or—as suggested later in this article—assume that his praise for Gandhi is merely a formality. That said, this pattern of disregarding Modi’s words is not exclusive to Mahatma Gandhi.

For example, when PM Modi sought to reassure India’s minority communities and genuinely implement his “Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas” (Together with All, Development for All) slogan, many of his supporters reacted with disappointment or disapproval. A similar reaction was seen when the government repealed the controversial farm laws. If we consider the improper language used on the internet, many of his supporters seemingly ignored the Prime Minister’s appeal regarding it. This also holds true in the case of gau rakshaks (cow vigilantes). Analysts believe that when a leader encourages extremist tendencies among his or her supporters for strategic convenience, it becomes increasingly difficult to rein them in later.

If we return to the criticism of Mahatma Gandhi by Modi supporters and examine history, we find that Hindu nationalist and right-wing political supporters have often denounced Gandhi’s nonviolent policies as acts of cowardice. Mahatma Gandhi, in turn, openly criticized the right wing’s hardline nationalist stance, their treatment of minorities, and their tendency to portray themselves as the protectors of civilization and culture. However, there is an odd contradiction here: right-wing supporters hold resentment against Gandhi for merely criticizing them verbally, yet they embrace Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who had once labeled the RSS as “forces of hate” and banned it.

Another contradiction is evident. Prime Minister Narendra Modi occasionally remembers Sardar Patel, whereas he frequently invokes Mahatma Gandhi’s name. If we recall some of his earliest initiatives after coming to power, such as the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (Clean India Mission), or examine his more recent policies promoting self-reliance, both are deeply rooted in Gandhi’s core teachings of cleanliness and self-sufficiency. In contrast, Patel’s legacy under Modi’s government has largely been limited to the Statue of Unity. Despite this, there has been no visible shift in Modi supporters’ admiration for Patel and their hostility toward Gandhi.

When it comes to critics of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, they often raise the question: Is his love for Gandhi genuine? Some of Modi’s critics believe that his supporters do not align with him on the issue of Gandhi because they recognize that his admiration is merely superficial. These critics argue that if this were not the case, the BJP would have taken action against leaders within the party who have insulted Gandhi.

Congress leader Shashi Tharoor has expressed skepticism about Modi’s intentions regarding Gandhi, stating that Modi was politically nurtured in an environment that harbored hatred for Gandhi and that for him, Gandhi is merely an effective marketing strategy. Many others also accuse Narendra Modi of acting in ways that contradict Gandhi’s ideals.

However, despite these criticisms, Prime Minister Modi’s public conduct toward Mahatma Gandhi remains exemplary, and at the very least, his supporters should take note of this.